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EXPERT TESTIMONY ON THE
RELIABILITY OF EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATIONS: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF ITS ADMISSIBILITY
State v. Lawhorn'
State v. WhitmilP
Eyewitness identification has continually played a significant role in
the American criminal justice system. Prosecutors and judges have often
relied upon eyewitness testimony to obtain convictions. On numerous oc-
casions, juries have convicted defendants based solely on the testimony of
a single eyewitness. The widespread acceptance of eyewitness testimony is
demonstrated by adherence to the "one-witness" rule which allows con-
victions based on the uncorroborated identification testimony of a single
eyewitness in a majority of jurisdictions.' The need for eyewitness iden-
tification testimony partially explains the continued acceptance. Eyewitness
identification adds an element of certainty to cases involving weak cir-
cumstantial evidence. 4 Often the only evidence linking the defendant to a
crime is a positive identification by an eyewitness.
American jurists have justified their unabashed reliance on eyewitness
testimony with the assumption that eyewitness identifications are generally
reliable. This assumption, however, is questionable. Three factors cast doubt
on the reliability of eyewitness identification. First, commentators have
thoroughly documented the occurrence of erroneous convictions based on
1. State v. Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
2. State v. Whitmill, No. 30-472 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 3, 1989).
3. United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 554 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Comment,
Eyewitness Identification: Should Psychologists Be Permitted to Address the Jury?,
75 J. CanI. L. & CRIMNOLOGY 1321, 1322 (1984) (authored by Margaret J. Lane)
[hereinafter Lane]; Comment, Eyewitness Testimony and the Need for Cautionary
Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 1387, 1391-92 (1982) (authored
by Steven E. Holtshouser) [hereinafter Holtshouser]. See generally 7 J. WIGMORB,
EVIDENCE § 2034, at 342-43 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1978). But see United States v.
Butler, 636 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1019 (1981) (one-
witness rule questioned in dissenting opinion in criminal prosecution when conviction
was based on testimony of one eyewitness to crime).
4. Lane, supra note 3, at 1322.
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mistaken identification.- Justice Felix Frankfurter once commented, "The
identification of strangers is proverbially untrustworthy. The hazards of
such testimony are established by a formidable number of instances in the
records of English and American trials." '6 Furthermore, conviction of in-
nocent people is inconsistent with concepts of justice. Mistaken identifi-
cations "have been thought by many experts to present what is conceivably
the greatest single threat to the achievement of our ideal that no innocent
man shall be punished." 7
Second, the United States Supreme Court, as well as many lower courts,
has recognized persistent problems associated with eyewitness testimony.8
In United States v. Wade,9 the Supreme Court emphatically stated: "The
vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal
law are rife with instances of mistaken identification." °10 The Supreme Court
has attempted to establish constitutional safeguards to protect criminal
5. See generally E. BLOCK, THE VINDICATORS (1963); E. BocHApm, CoN-
viCTING THE INNOCENT (1932); F. FRANKMRTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI
(1927); E. GARDNER, THE COURT OF LAST RESORT (1952). In CoNVIcTNO Tim
INNOcENT, Bochard described wrongful criminal convictions of 65 persons in 27
different states. Yet, several psychologists claim that "documented cases of wrongful
conviction resulting from mistaken eyewitness testimony obviously represent only
a small fraction of 1% of the cases in which defendants were convicted at least
in part on the basis of eyewitness testimony." McCloskey & Egeth, Eyewitness
Identification: What Can a Psychologist Tell a Jury?, 38 AMi. PSYCHOLOGIST 550,
552 (1983).
6. F. FRANKmRTER, supra note 5, at 30.
7. McGowan, Constitutional Interpretation and Criminal Identification, 12
Wii. & MARY L. Ruv. 235, 238 (1970). See also Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293,
297 (1967) (mistaken identification is a gross miscarriage of justice); People v.
Lewis, 137 Misc. 2d 84, 86, 520 N.Y.S.2d 125, 127 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1987) ("IM]istaken
identification 'probably accounts for more miscarriages of justice than any other
single factor-perhaps it is responsible for more such errors than all other factors
combined."') (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 229 (1967)).
8. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228-32 (1967). See also Watkins
v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 350 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (eyewitness iden-
tification notoriously unreliable); State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 392, 635 P.2d
1236, 1241 (1981) ("[C]ases of mistaken identification are not infrequent and the
problem of misidentification has not been alleviated.").
Trial courts have devised interesting methods to combat the possibility of
mistaken identifications. For instance, one commentator rioted:
A judge in New York City developed his own system to check on the
frequency of mistaken identifications. In ten cases in which the identification
of the accused was virtually the only evidence, the judge permitted defense
attorneys to seat a look-alike alongside the defendant. In only two of the
ten cases was the witness able to identify the defendant.
Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the Un-
reliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAN. L. Rv. 969, 969 n.3 (1977) (citing
TimE, April 2, 1973, at 59).
9. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
10. Id. at 228.
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defendants from misidentifications. Its efforts have centered on the elim-
ination of suggestive police procedures at pre-trial identification proceedings
rather than the explanation of eyewitnesses' inability to accurately perceive,
remember and retrieve their observations."' Unfortunately, these constitu-
tional protections, which were fairly extensive at one point, have now been
greatly limited by subsequent Supreme Court decisions.' 2 Therefore, mis-
taken identifications still present pervasive problems within the criminal
justice system for which a satisfactory solution must be found.
Third, an extensive body of psychological research refutes the as-
sumption that eyewitness identification is reliable.' 3 Psychologists claim that
11. Discussion of the constitutional safeguards protecting defendants from
suggestive identifications is beyond the scope of this Note. Briefly, however, the
United States Supreme Court decided the landmark Wade trilogy in 1967, which
established a defendant's constitutional right to have counsel present at any critical
stage of criminal prosecutions, including pre-trial lineups. The trilogy included
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263
(1967), and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). The Court held that evidence
of suggestive pre-trial lineup identifications was per se inadmissible. Gilbert, 388
U.S. at 273. In addition, it held that in-court identifications, made after suggestive
lineups, were likewise inadmissible unless "clear and convincing evidence" showed
the identification had a basis independent of the pre-trial identification. Wade, 388
U.S. at 240.
12. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have greatly undermined the ef-
fectiveness of the Wade trilogy, particularly Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972),
and United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973). These decisions modified the Wade
trilogy such that the right to counsel now attaches only after the initiation of
formal judicial criminal proceedings. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689-90. Furthermore, there
is no right to counsel at photographic display sessions. Ash, 413 U.S. at 321.
This curtailing of constitutional protection has received much criticism. One
commentator, in reference to Kirby and Ash, stated: "The right to counsel at
identification procedures established in Wade has become virtually a dead letter
owing to two decisions." N. SOBEL, EYEWrrNESS IDENTIMCATION: LEGAL AND PRAC-
TICAL PROBLEMS § 1.5, at 1-10 (2nd rev. ed. 1985).
13. See generally CLIFFORD & BULL, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSON IDENTI-
FICATION (1979); EVALUATING EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: RECENT PSYCHOLOGICAL RE-
SEARCH AND NEW PERSPECTIVES (Lloyd-Bostock & Clifford ed. 1983); EYEWITNESS
TEsmboNy: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (G. Wells & E. Loftus eds. 1984) [here-
inafter PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES]; E. LoFrus, EYEwrrNEss TESTIMONY (1979)
[hereinafter E. LoFrus]; N. SOBEL, supra note 12; P. WALL, EYE-WITNESS IDEN-
TIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES (1965); YAnmY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS
TESTimONY (1979); Brigham & Barkowitz, Do "They All Look Alike?" The Effect
of Race, Sex and Attitudes on the Ability to Recognize Faces, 8 J. APPLIED Soc.
PSYCHOLOGY 306 (1978); Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony, 15 JURMETRICS 171
(1975); Cutler, Penrod & Stuve, Juror Decision Making in Eyewitness Identification
Cases, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 41 (1988); Deffenbacher, Eyewitness Accuracy and
Confidence: Can We Infer Anything about Their Relationship?, 4 LAW & Hum.
BEIAV. 243 (1980); Fox & Walters, The Impact of General Versus Specific Expert
Testimony and Eyewitness Confidence Upon Mock Juror Judgment, 10 LAW &
HUM. BEHAv. 215 (1986); Goodman & Reed, Age Differences in Eyewitness Tes-
timony, 10 LAW & Hum. BEHAV. 317 (1986); Hosch, Beck & McIntyre, Influence
1989]
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eyewitness identifications are frequently inaccurate due to subtle suggestive
influences that occur during the memory process. 14 In addition, these re-
searchers argue that the average juror or judge is unaware of these influ-
ences.' 5 In fact, studies show that most jurors have many common
misconceptions regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification. 16 In
many instances, these misconceptions are contrary to the actual operation
of the memory process. 7 Given jurors' tendency to hold these misconcep-
tions and their tendency to place considerable weight on eyewitness tes-
timony,"' many psychologists and attorneys advocate the admission of expert
of Expert Testimony Regarding Eyewitness Accuracy on Jury Decisions, 4 LAW &
Hum. BEuAv. 287 (1980); Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal
Cases, 69 Copaiu-. L. REv. 934 (1984); Koneeni, Courtroom Testimony by Psy-
chologists on Eyewitness Identification Issues: Critical Notes and Reflections, 10
LAw & Hum. BEHAv. 117 (1986); Leippe, Effects of Integrative Memorial and
Cognitive Processes on the Correspondence of Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence,
4 LAw & Hum. BEHAv. 261 (1980); Levine & Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal
Identification: The Gap from Wade to Kirby, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1079 (1973);
Lindsay, Confidence and Accuracy of Eyewitness Identification from Lineups, 10
LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 229 (1986); Loftus & Green, Warning: Even Memory for
Faces May Be Contagious, 4 LAw & Hum. BEHAv. 323 (1980); Wells, Expert
Psychological Testimony, 10 LAw & Hum. BEHAv. 83 (1986); Wells, Lindsay &
Ferguson, Accuracy, Confidence, and Juror Perceptions in Eyewitness Identification,
64 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 440 (1979); Wells, Lindsay & Tousignant, Effects of
Expert Psychological Advice on Human Performance in Judging the Validity of
Eyewitness Testimony, 4 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 275 (1980); Yarmey, Ethical Re-
sponsibilities Governing the Statements Experimental Psychologists Make in Expert
Testimony, 10 LAw & HuM. BEHAv. 101 (1986); Yarmey & Kent, Eyewitness
Identification by Elderly and Young Adults, 4 LAw & HuM. BEHAv. 359 (1980);
Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the Un-
reliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAN. L. REv. 969 (1977) (authored by
Fredric D. Woocher) [hereinafter Woocher]. See generally State v. Warren, 230
Kan. 385, 635 P.2d 1236 (1981).
14. E. Lorus, supra note 13, at 21-22; P. WALL, supra note 13, at 8-9.
15. E. Losrtus, supra note 13, at 21-22; P. WALL, supra note 13, at 8-9.
16. State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, -, 660 P.2d 1208, 1220-21 (1983);
Abney, Expert Testimony and Eyewitness Identification, 91 CASE & CoM. 26 (1986).
See also E. LoFrus, supra note 13, at 171-77; Deffenbacher & Loftus, Do Jurors
Share a Common Understanding Concerning Eyewitness Behavior?, 6 LAw & Hum.
BEHAv. 15 (1982); Note, Admission of Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identifi-
cation, 73 CALir. L. REv. 1402, 1404 (1985) (authored by Christopher M. Walters)
[hereinafter Walters]; Note, Evaluating Eyewitness Testimony in Criminal Trials:
Can Jurors Use Help From Experts? 63 Cm.[-]KENT L. REv. 137, 141 (1987)
(authored by Maureen A. Gorman) [hereinafter Gorman].
17. See also Chapple, 135 Ariz. at -, 660 P.2d at 1220-21; People v.
McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 368, 690 P.2d 709, 720, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236, 247 (1984);
E. LoFrus, supra note 13, at 171-77; Deffenbacher & Loftus, supra note 16;
Walters, supra note 16, at 1404; Gorman, supra note 16, at 141.
18. See E. LoFrus, supra note 13, at 8-19; P. WALL, supra note 13, at 19-
23; Brigham & Bothwell, The Ability of Prospective Jurors to Estimate the Accuracy
of Eyewitness Identifications, 7 LAw & Hum. BEHAv. 19 (1983); Wells, Lindsay
[Vol. 54
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testimony 9 regarding the unreliablity of eyewitness identification. 20 They
contend that the admission of expert psychological testimony which outlines
various factors affecting identification reliability would mitigate the prob-
lems associated with eyewitness testimony.
2
'
The issue of whether expert psychological testimony should be admitted
is yet unresolved. Despite recommendations of the psychology profession,
courts have traditionally excluded such testimony for a host of reasons. 2
A modern trend, however, favors the admissibility of such expert evidence.2Y
This trend began in 1983 when the Arizona Supreme Court became the
first appellate court to overrule a trial court's exclusion of expert psycho-
logical testimony in State v. Chapple.Y The California Supreme Court
immediately followed Arizona's lead with a similar holding in People v.
McDonald.25 Yet, admission of such testimony has continued to meet strong
resistance in other jurisdictions.
Missouri appellate courts have indirectly confronted the issue of ad-
mission of expert psychological testimony in State v. Bulington26 and State
& Ferguson, Accuracy, Confidence, and Juror Perceptions in Eyewitness Identi-
fication, 64 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 440, 446-47 (1979); Gorman, supra note 16,
at 141. But see Wells, Applied Eyewitness Testimony Research: System Variables
and Estimator Variables, 36 J. PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 1546, 1551 (1978)
(no empirical evidence supports the assumption that jurors and judges overbelieve
witnesses).
One court stated, "[B]ecause eyewitness testimony is such powerful stuff and
can decide a case on its own strength, it can blind a jury to other exculpatory
evidence or inferences .... [E]yewitness testimony is among the most influential,
even as it is among the least reliable, forms of proof." Kampshoff v. Smith, 698
F.2d 581, 587 (2d Cir. 1983).
19. The term "expert psychological testimony" shall be used hereinafter in
reference to expert testimony regarding the unreliability of eyewitness identifications.
20. E. LoFrus, supra note 13, at 8-19; N. SOBEL, supra note 12, §§ 9.6-
9.8; P. WALL, supra note 13, at 212-13; Lane, supra note 3, at 1322; Woocher,
supra note 13, at 969-1030. See generally Monahan & Loftus, Trial by Data-
Psychological Research as Legal Evidence, 35 AM. PSYCHOLOGY 270 (1980); Rahaim
& Brodsky, Empirical Evidence Versus Common Sense: Juror and Lawyer Knowledge
of Eyewitness Accuracy, 7 LAW & PSYCHOLOGY REv. 1 (1982).
21. E. Lorrus, supra note 13, at 8-19; N. SOBEL, supra note 12, §§ 9.6-.8;
P. WALL, supra note 13, at 212-13; Monahan & Loftus, supra note 20, at 191;
Rahaim & Brodsky, supra note 20, at 1; Lane, supra note 3, at 1322; Woocher,
supra note 13, at 969-1030.
22. Sanders, Expert Witnesses in Eyewitness Facial Identification Cases, 17
TEx. TECH L. REv. 1409, 1422 (1986); Lane, supra note 3, at 1339-1345. See supra
notes 89-113 and accompanying text for discussion of the most common of these
justifications.
23. State v. Cooper, 708 S.W.2d 299, 303 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (eastern
district).
24. 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983).
25. 37 Cal. 3d 351, 690 P.2d 709, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1984).
26. 680 S.W.2d 238 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (western district), conviction over-
turned, 684 S.W.2d 52 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
1989]
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v. Cooper.27 Neither case, however, ruled the question "authoritatively and
unequivocally," therefore, the issue remained unresolved. In 1988, the
Missouri Supreme Court addressed the admissibility of such testimony as
an issue of first impression in State v. Lawhorn.29 In January 1989, the
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, also confronted the issue in
State v. Whitmill.'0
This Note will analyze the use and admissibility of expert psychological
testimony. It will explain the nature of expert psychological testimony, the
common misconceptions affecting a juror's view of the reliability of eye-
witness identification and the standard reasons used to justify the exclusion
of such expert testimony. It will survey the treatment of this type of
testimony in other jurisdictions. It will emphasize the status of admissibility
in Missouri, focusing on State v. Lawhorn and State v. Whitmill, as well
as analyze prior treatment of the issue by Missouri courts. Finally, it will
argue that the Missouri Supreme Court failed to resolve the issue of
admissibility in Lawhorn and that Whitmill's per se rule of inadmissibility
is logically incorrect and should be overruled. Instead, the supreme court
should have adopted a multi-factor guideline for use by trial courts in
determining when exclusion of such testimony constitutes an abuse of
discretion.
I. Tm NATURE OF EXPERT PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY
A. Substance of the Testimony
Expert psychological testimony focuses on various factors that may
have a critical impact on the accuracy of identifications.31 Psychological
researchers argue that testimony related to factors affecting the process of
identification would aid the jury in evaluating identification testimony.3 2
27. 708 S.W.2d 299 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (eastern district).
28. State v. Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d 820, 822 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
29. 762 S.W.2d 820, 822 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
30. State v. Whitmill, No. 30-472 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 3, 1989).
31. Brigham, The Accuracy of Eyewitness Evidence: How do Attorneys See
It?, 55 FLA. B.J. 714, 720 (1981).
32. E. Lorvus, supra note 13, at 191; P. WALL, supra note 13, at 212-13;
Rahaim & Brodsky, supra note 20, at 1-2; Wells, Lindsay & Tousignant, supra
note 13, at 284-85. Furthermore, Professor McCormick clearly expressed his approval
of the use of expert psychological testimony in some instances. He stated:
[I]t would seem that the researchers have something to offer, and that
where a case turns on uncorroborated eyewitness recognition, the courts
should be receptive to expert testimony about the knowledge, gleaned from
methodologically sound experimentation, concerning the factors that may
have produced a faulty identification.... While it seems that expert
testimony on the psychology of eyewitness identification may not be nec-
essary or appropriate in many cases, in those instances where the case
turns on the eyewitness testimony and the expert's assistance could make
a difference, the scientific knowledge generally should be admitted.
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A synopsis of the psychological process of eyewitness identification is helpful
in understanding the nature of the expert testimony. Psychologists uni-
versally recognize three stages in the process: (1) perception; (2) retention;
and (3) retrieval.3 3 First, the eyewitness must perceive or observe the in-
dividual's face. 34 At this point, the image is encoded in the eyewitness's
memory.'5 Next, he must retain the full perception without distortion during
the intervening time from observation to recollection. 6 Finally, the individual
must retrieve an accurate description of the stored image. 37 Various psy-
chological factors may affect eyewitness identification at each of these
stages. 8 A qualified psychologist could testify to the existence and effect
of each relevant factor. He could explain "event factors"-those related
to the actual observation and nature of the encounter 39-as well as "witness
factors"-those related to the emotions and experience of a particular
person. 40 In addition, a psychologist could refute many misconceptions that
are held by jurors regarding identification reliability.
Psychological research regarding eyewitness identification reliability be-
gan in the early nineteenth century. 41 Noting the recurring discrepancies
between eyewitness accounts, psychologists began to study the memory
process in relation to eyewitness identification. 42 Despite this early start,
the majority of the research on the subject has been conducted in the past
fifteen to twenty years by a number of respected psychologists.43 Today,
an expansive body of empirical research exists supporting these psychol-
33. E. LoFrus, supra note 13, at 21; Lane, supra note 3, at 1333.
34. E. Loirts, supra note 13, at 21.
35. Id. at 21; Woocher, supra note 13, at 974 n.11.
36. E. LoFrus, supra note 13, at 21; Woocher, supra note 13, at 974 n.ll.
37. E. LoFrus, supra note 13, at 21; Woocher, supra note 13, at 974 n.11.
38. Lane, supra note 3, at 1333.
39. E. LoFrus, supra note 13, at 23.
40. Id. at 32.
41. Woocher, supra note 13, at 974. Psychological research regarding eye-
witness identification evolved from distinct, specialized subcategories within the
psychology field, each previously studied independently. These subcategories revolved
around perception, memory and social psychology. Research on the reliability of
eyewitness identification reflects a combination of these three areas. Id.
Psychologists working within these separate fields concentrate on different
aspects of the human memory. Perception specialists focus on factors affecting an
individual's awareness of stimuli by the use of his sensory organs. They also study
the influence that prior experiences have on sensory ability. Memory specialists
concentrate on alterations made to encoded images during the interim from per-
ception to retrieval. Social psychologists delve into the influences other individuals
have on the memory process. Id.
42. Id. The preeminent researcher at the time was Hugo Munsterberg who
wrote the classic treatise on the subject. See H. MuNsTRERG, ON TIM WrrINss
SrAD (1908).
43. Among these scholars are Dr. Elizabeth Loftus, professor of psychology
at the University of Washington-Seattle, and Dr. Robert Buckhout, professor of
psychology at Brooklyn College, Brooklyn, New York.
19891
7
Hamilton: Hamilton: Expert Testimony on the Reliability of Eyewitness Identifications
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
ogists' argument that their testimony can assist a jury in evaluating eye-
witness testimony."
Although the majority of psychologists support the admission of expert
psychological testimony, a small faction contends that only weak empirical
evidence supports the hypothesis that such expert testimony will improve
a juror's ability to evaluate eyewitness testimony.45 Yet, this minority
concedes that such expert testimony may offer at least some assistance to
jurors." These psychologists also contend that juries tend to overemphasize
expert psychological testimony. Such overemphasis results from the supposed
"aura of reliability" surrounding expert testimony.47 Therefore, this faction
requests more research concerning the effect expert psychological testimony
has on jurors. 41
B. Common Misconceptions Regarding Identification Reliability
The average juror holds many erroneous beliefs regarding the reliability
of eyewitness identification. Proponents of expert psychological testimony
claim that such testimony can be useful in dispelling these misconceptions.
For instance, many jurors lack a comprehensive understanding of the "own-
race effect" by which an eyewitness is more accurate in identifying a person
of his own race than someone of another race. 49 Although many jurors
44. See generally E. LoFrus, supra, note 13; PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES,
supra, note 13; N. SOBEL, supra note 12; P. WALL, supra note 13; Buckhout, supra
note 13; Cutler, Penrod & Stuve, supra note 13; Deffenbacher, supra note 13; Fox
& Walters, supra note 13; Goodman & Reed, suiora note 13; Hosch, Beck &
McIntyre, supra note 13; Johnson, supra note 13; Konecni, supra note 13; Leippe,
supra note 13; Lindsay, supra note 13; Loftus & Green, supra note 13; Wells,
supra note 13; Wells, Lindsay & Tousignant, supra note 13; Yarmey, supra note
13; Yarmey & Kent, supra note 13; Woocher, supra note 13.
45. See generally McCloskey & Egeth, supra note 5; Egeth & McCloskey,
Expert Testimony About Eyewitness Behavior: Is It Safe and Effective?, in Psy-
CHOLOGICAL PERSPECTiVES, supra note 13, at 283.
In People v. McDonald, the Arizona Supreme Court addressed the position
of this minority group. The court indicated that "on close examination it appears
the principal complaint of Egeth and McCloskey is not so much that expert testimony
on eyewitness identification should never be admissible, as that it is too soon to
admit it: additional research is needed." 37 Cal. 3d 351, 369 n.15, 690 P.2d 709,
721 n.15, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236, 248 n.15 (1984). The court also observed, "IT]his
is a frequent conclusion of academic authors .... [A]ppellate judges do not have
the luxury of waiting until their colleagues in the sciences unanimously agree that
on a particular issue no more research is necessary. Given the nature of the scientific
endeavor, that day may never come." Id.
46. McCloskey & Egeth, supra note 5, at 558. As noted, these psychologists
suggest that additional research is necessary. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.; Sanders, supra note 22, at 1459-64.
49. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d at 368, 690 P.2d at 720, 208 Cal. Rptr. at
__.; Abney, supra note 16, at 27.
[Vol. 54
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are probably somewhat aware of this "own-race effect," most do not
realize its "pervasive and even paradoxical nature." 50 Cross-racial identi-
fications tend to be most inaccurate when white witnesses attempt to
recognize black individuals.5' There is particularly strong empirical evidence
supporting the cross-racial identification theory.52
Three factors related to cross-racial identifications are likely to be
contrary to juror belief. First, white witnesses who are not racially prejudiced
are just as likely to make cross-racial misidentifications as those who are
prejudiced.53 Second, white witnesses who have experienced significantly
more social contact with blacks are no more accurate in their identifications
than those who have not.54 Third, jurors may deny the existence of the
"own-race effect" because it seems racist or may avoid discussing it in
deliberations for fear of appearing prejudiced.55
The existence of the "own-race effect" presents the strongest argument
for admission of expert psychological testimony. The empirical evidence
supporting the theory is considerably stronger than for any other factor
affecting identification. Since cross-racial identification arises in many crim-
inal trials and is a factor of which many jurors are unaware or refuse to
recognize, expert psychological testimony concerning cross-racial identifi-
cation could truly assist jurors in many cases. Yet, most judges refuse to
allow such testimony.56
Jurors also typically believe that the accuracy of an eyewitness iden-
tification increases with the eyewitness' certainty17 Empirical data suggests
that, in reality, no correlation exists between confidence and accuracy.58
This is especially true when the eyewitness views the perpetrator under
poor visibility conditions. 9 In some studies, the correlation was negative-
the more confident the witness, the more inaccurate his identification 0
Furthermore, experimental data indicates that expert psychological testimony
reduces the jury's reliance on eyewitness confidence in its evaluation of
50. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d at 368, 690 P.2d at 720, 208 Cal. Rptr. at
51. Johnson, supra note 13, at 938-39.
52. Id. at 936. According to one commentator, "In the last fifteen years,
psychologists have compiled empirical evidence that incontrovertibly demonstrates
a substantially greater rate of error in cross-racial recognition of faces." Id.
53. Id. at 943-44.
54. Id. at 944.
55. Id. at 969; McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d at 368, 690 P.2d at 721, 208 Cal.
Rptr. at _.
56. Johnson, supra note 13, at 936.
57. E. LoFrus, supra note 13, at 100-01; Abney, supra note 16, at 26.
58. Deffenbacher, supra note 13, at 245-46; Fox & Walters, supra note 13,
at 216; Leippe, supra note 13, at 271; Lindsay, supra note 13, at 230-31.
59. Fox & Walters, supra note 13, at 216.
60. Wells & Murray, Eyewitness Confidence, in PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVIS,
supra note 13, at 159-62.
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the eyewitness's testimony. 61 Because other studies have demonstrated only
a weak confidence-accuracy relationship, 62 several psychologists have re-
quested additional research to resolve the conflicting results before experts
incorporate the confidence-accuracy theory into their testimony. 63
Many laypersons believe that a witness' memory is enhanced by the
stress experienced in a criminal encounter. 4 In fact, research indicates that
one-third of the population erroneously believes that stress increases iden-
tification accuracy. 65 Yet, psychological research does not fully support this
belief. According to the Yerkes-Dodson law, "strong motivational states
such as stress or other emotional arousal facilitate learning and performance
up to a point, after which there is a decrement." '66 During the extremely
stressful situation of a criminal encounter, an eyewitness' ability to ac-
curately perceive and remember details is greatly reduced due the individual's
limited attention to details. 67 As tension mounts, people increasingly con-
centrate on only a few details and pay less attention to others s.6  This
phenomenom produces the "weapons effect." 69 When an assailant bran-
dishes a weapon, an eyewitness focuses on the weapon rather than the
assailant. 70 Thus, the eyewitness's ability to accurately identify an attacker
is greatly reduced. 7' Researchers admit, however, that evidence of the
"weapons effect" is not conclusive. 72
Many jurors also erroneously believe that a group consensus among
eyewitnesses lends reliability to identifications. 73 But, due to the "feedback
factor," a group consensus is more likely to be inaccurate than an individual
identification.74 Feedback occurs when multiple eyewitnesses engage in dis-
cussions regarding the identification of the offender. 7 The result is that
each witness reinforces the others' certainty in the identifications. 76
Psychologists sometimes contend that the average juror also may not
be aware of the "forgetting curve." ' 77 The "forgetting curve" depicts the
61. Fox & Walters, supra note 13, at 216.
62. Id.
63. Leippe, supra note 13, at 261-62; Lindsay, supra note 13, at 237-38.
64. E. Lorrus, supra note 13, at 33-36, 153-56; Abney, supra note 16, at
26. See also State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, -, 660 P.2d 1208, 1221 (1983).
65. Id. at 174.
66. E. Lorrus, supra note 13, at 33.
67. Id. at 33-35, 153-55.
68. Id. at 35.
69. Id.
70. Id.; Abney, supra note 16, at 26-27.
71. E. Lorrus, supra note 13, at 35; Abney, supra note 16, at 27.
72. E. Lorus, supra note 13, at 35.
73. Abney, supra note 16, at 27.
74. Id. See also State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, - , 660 P.2d 1208, 1221
(1983).
75. Abney, supra note 16, at 27.
76. Id.
77. Lane, supra note 3, at 1336.
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human memory's propensity to fade over time.7 It demonstrates that the
majority of an eyewitness' memory loss occurs within minutes of the crime. 79
Expert psychological testimony related to the "forgetting curve," however,
would not greatly assist the jury since "it is common knowledge that
memory and sense impressions fade with the passage of time. Any belief
that memory is enhanced or remain[s] consistent over time is 'contrary to
the natural order of things."'8 0
Most jurors are unaware that post-event external information can en-
hance or change a witness's memory or even cause nonexistent details to
become integrated into the previously stored image.81 A change in the stored
data can result from the witness's exposure to newspaper reports, questions
from police officers, conversations with other witnesses or additional ex-
posure to the accused offender.8 2 This is a relatively unknown phenomenon.
Also, few jurors are familiar with the common occurrence of "un-
conscious transference." 3 Unconscious transference refers to the tendency
of the eyewitness to confuse a person seen in one situation with a person
seen in another situation. 4 Strong empirical data supports its existence. 5
The phenomenom is particularly troublesome because it is nearly impossible
to detect.86 Transference is aggravated by an uncertain witness's tendency
to close memory gaps by adjusting his recollection of an incident.87 Witnesses
may also guess in response to a subconscious need to reduce uncertainty
or to cooperate in the investigation.8
II. STANDARD REASONS FOR EXCLUSION OF EXPERT PSYCHOLOGICAL
TEsTnmoNY
The majority of jurisdictions have upheld trial court exclusion of expert
psychological testimony. 9 In doing so, courts have relied upon many dif-
78. E. LoFrus, supra note 13, at 53; Lane, supra note 3, at 1336.
79. Lane, supra note 3, at 1336.
80. P. WALL, supra note 13, at 127 (quoting People v. Cassidy, 160 A.D.
651, 657, 146 N.Y.S. 15, 18-19 (N.Y. App. Div. 1914)).
81. E. LoFrus, supra note 13, at 55; Lane, supra note 3, at 1336.
82. E. LoFrus, supra note 13, at 78.
83. E. LoFrus, supra note 13, at 142-43; Loftus, Unconscious Transference
in Eyewitness Identification, 2 LAW & PSYCHOLOGY 93, 96 (1976) [Unconscious
Transference]; Lane, supra note 3, at 1338.
84. E. Lorus, supra note 13, at 142; Lane, supra note 3, at 1338.
85. Unconscious Transference, supra note 83, at 94-96. One controlled ex-
periment indicated that 79% of the subjects experienced unconscious transference.
Id.
86. E. LoFrus, supra note 13, at 142-44.
87. E. Lorrus, supra note 13, at 82-83; Lane, supra note 3, at 1337.
88. Buckhout, supra nofe 13, at 181.
89. State v. Lawhorn, No. 39-524, slip op. at 6 (Mo. Ct. App. Feb. 9,
1988) (unreported western district appellate decision).
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ferent justifications for the wholesale exclusion of such testimony. A brief
discussion of some of the common justifications propounded by these
courts is beneficial.
The most commonly cited reason for exclusion of expert psychological
testimony is the claim that such testimony "invades the province of the
jury" or "usurps" its function as the trier of fact.90 The bald use of these
phrases as justification for exclusion of evidence, without more, has gen-
erally met with disapproval from legal scholars.9' Many courts, however,
have extended their analyses and stated that invasion of the jury's province
occurs because the factors encompassed within such testimony are within
the common knowledge of jurors. 92 Furthermore, many appellate courts
90. United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048, 1054 (10th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1100 (1977); United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146, 150 (9th Cir.
1974), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225
(1975); Caldwell v. State, 267 Ark. 1053, 1059, 594 S.W.2d 24, 28 (Ark. Ct. App.
1980); People v. Walker, 41 Cal. App. 3d 116, -, 711 P.2d 465, 473, 222 Cal.
Rptr. 169, 177 (1985), aff'd on rehearing, 47 Cal. App. 3d 605, 765 P.2d 70, 253
Cal. Rptr. 863 (1988); People v. Brooks, 51 Cal. App. 3d 602, -, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 492, 495 (1975); Jones v. State, 232 Ga. 762, 764, 208 S.E.2d 850, 852-53
(1974); State v. Stucke, 419 So. 2d 939, 945 (La. 1982); State v. Ammons, 208
Neb. 812, 815, 305 N.W.2d 812, 814-15 (1981); Porter v. State, 94 Nev. 142,
-, 576 P.2d 275, 278-79 (1988); People v. Brown, 117 Misc. 2d 587, 594, 459
N.Y.S.2d 227, 232 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1983); People v. Valentine, 53 A.D.2d 832, 833,
385 N.Y.S.2d 545, 546 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976).
91. 7 J. WiGmoRE, EvmENcE § 1920, at 18-21 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1978).
Wigmore adamantly stated:
[T]he phrase is so misleading, as well as so unsound, that it should be
entirely repudiated. It is a mere bit of empty rhetoric .... [The witness,
in expressing his opinion, is not attempting to 'usurp ' the jury's function
.... [T]he jury may still reject his opinion and accept some other view,
and no legal power, not even the judge's order, can compel them to accept
the witness' opinion against their own.
Id. at 18-19 (footnotes omitted). Bloodsworth v. State, 307 Md. 164, 185, 512
A.2d 1056, 1066 (1986), noted that both "Wigmore and McCormick think little
of the argument that opinions on the very issue before the jury should be rejected
because they invade the province of the jury." Id. McCormick states that the
phrase "invades the province of the jury" is not intended to be taken literally,
rather it suggests the danger that the jury might be overly impressed by the expert's
testimony. McCoRMicK, supra note 32, § 12, at 30. In addition, Grismore v.
Consolidated Production Co., 232 Iowa 328, 345, 5 N.W.2d 646, 655-56 (1942),
similarly noted that courts have permitted the "invasion of the province of the
jury" objection "to become almost a fetish." Id. Grismore noted, "The ablest
writers and authorities on evidence have severely condemned these objections as
being without any sound basis." Id. See also Murphy, An Evaluation of the
Arguments Against the Use of Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification, 8
U. BR GEPORT L. Rv. 21, 27-28 (1987).
92. United States v. Dowling, 855 F.2d 114, 118 (3rd Cir. 1988); United
States v. Purham, 725 F.2d 450, 454 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Thevis, 665
F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982); United States v. Watson,
587 F.2d 365, 369 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979); United States
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believe that expert psychological testimony essentially tells the jury whether
or not to believe the eyewitness. Thus, it interferes with the jury's task
of weighing the credibility of witnesses-a task entrusted to the jury.93
Using either Federal Rule of Evidence 403 or a similar state rule,
94
some courts have excluded expert psychological testimony because its prej-
udicial effect is said to substantially outweigh its probative value. 95 Sup-
posedly, the "aura of reliability" surrounding expert testimony leads the
jury to give undue consideration to the expert testimony; thus, expert
testimony greatly diminishes jury belief of eyewitness testimony.96 Although
v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Fosher, 449 F.
Supp. 76, 77 (D. Mass. 1978), aff'd, 590 F.2d 381 (1st Cir. 1979); State v. Poland,
144 Ariz. 388, -, 698 P.2d 183, 193 (1985), aff'd, 476 U.S. 147 (1985); People
v. Beaver, 725 P.2d 96, 99 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Kemp, 199 Conn. 473,
477-78, 507 A.2d 1387, 1389 (1986); Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827, 832
(D.C.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 973 (1977); Johnson v. State, 438 So. 2d 774, 777
(Fla. 1983); Nelson v. State, 362 So. 2d 1017, 1021 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978);
Porter v. State, 188 Ga. App. 675, -, 373 S.E.2d 805, 807 (1988); State v.
Hoisington, 104 Idaho 153, 165, 657 P.2d 17, 29 (1983); People v. Dixon, 87 Ill.
App. 3d 814, 818, 410 N.E.2d 252, 256 (1980); State v. Stucke, 419 So. 2d 939,
945 (La. 1982); State v. Fernald, 397 A.2d 194, 197 (Me. 1979); Commonwealth
v. Francis, 390 Mass. 89, 101, 453 N.E.2d 1204, 1210 (1983); Commonwealth v.
Middleton, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 902, __, 378 N.E.2d 450, 450 (1978); State v.
Helterbridle, 301 N.W.2d 545, 547 (Minn. 1980); State v. Ammons, 208 Neb. 812,
814, 305 N.W.2d 812, 814 (1981); People v. Valentine, 53 A.D.2d 832, 833, 385
N.Y.S.2d 545, 546 (1976); State v. Porraro, 121 R.I. 882, 892-93, 404 A.2d 465,
471 (1979); State v. Wooden, 658 S.W.2d 553, 556 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983); State
v. Onorato, 142 Vt. 99, 104-05, 453 A.2d 393, 395-96 (1982).
One court has reasoned:
If the reliability of the identifications can be adequately questioned by
[cross-examination and closing arguments] and the jury is capable of
understanding the reasons why they may be unreliable, the introduction
of expert testimony would be "a superfluous attempt to put the gloss of
expertise, like a bit of frosting, upon inferences which lay persons were
equally capable of drawing from the evidence."
State v. George, 194 Conn. 361, 373, 481 A.2d 1068, 1074-75 (1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1191 (1985).
93. A more complete refutation of this argument is presented in Section V
in the context of the State v. Lawhorn analysis. See infra notes 195-218 and
accompanying text.
94. See infra note 203 for the text of FED. R. Evm. 403.
95. United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 825 (1982); United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 383 (Ist Cir. 1979); United
States v. Watson, 587 F.2d 365, 368-69 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1132 (1979); United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146, 150 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd on
other grounds sub noma. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975); United
States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 1973).
96. United States v. Purham, 725 F.2d 450, 454 (8th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 383 (Ist Cir. 1979); United States v. Amaral, 488
F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Collins, 395 F. Supp. 629, 637
(M.D. Pa.), aff'd, 523 F.2d 1051 (1975); Commonwealth v. Francis, 390 Mass.
13
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research supports this assertion, there remains some question of whether
jurors actually hold expert testimony in any higher esteem than eyewitness
testimony.9 Courts also rely on Federal Rule of Evidence 403 or similar
state rules to argue that admission of such expert testimony results in
undue consumption of trial time 6r tends to confuse the jury9R
A number of courts have also stated that admitting expert psychological
testimony would lead to a "battle of the experts."99 If courts freely allowed
defendants to introduce such testimony, prosecutors would presumably
demand introduction of their own expert to counter the defendant's expert.
In this manner, the floodgates would open and a battle between the two
experts would ensue in many criminal cases. Thus, opponents argue that
exclusion of the expert testimony is necessary to minimize the confusion
resulting from the jury's struggle to determine which expert to believe and
to avoid undue time consumption. Assuming that misidentification is a
troublesome and recurring problem and that expert testimony may alleviate
it, should courts exclude expert testimony based merely on grounds of
undue time consumption or juror confusion?10°
Almost all courts ruling such testimony inadmissible have asserted that
various procedural protections are sufficient to protect defendants against
misidentification. 0' These procedural safeguards include: exclusion of sus-
89, 96, 453 N.E.2d 1204, 1207-08 (1983); Porter v. State, 94 Nev. 142, 147-48,
576 P.2d 275, 278-79 (1978). See also Hosch, Beck & McIntyre, supra note 13,
at 287-89; Loftus, Impact of Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability
of Eyewitness Identification, 65 J. APPLIED PSYcHoLoOGY 9, 14-15 (1980); Sanders,
supra note 22, at 1460; Wells, Lindsay & Tousignant, supra note 13, at 279-80.
97. Hosch, Beck & McIntyre, supra note 13, at 294 (expert psychological
testimony does significantly influence jurors' beliefs in the reliability and accuracy
of eyewitness testimony but does not lower eyewitness's credibility; it lowers the
weight accorded eyewitness identification); Wells, Lindsay & Tousignant, supra note
13, at 284-85 (expert psychological testimony can reduce overbelief bias and greatly
reduce jurors' reliance on eyewitness confidence).
98. United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146, 150 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975) (undue
consumption of time would substantially outweigh the probative value of expert
psychological testimony); United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir.
1973) (expert psychological testimony might tend to result in jury confusion and
undue consumption of time); Commonwealth v. Francis, 390 Mass. 89, 100, 453
N.E.2d 1204, 1210 (1983) (Expert psychological testimony can "prolong a trial,
raise collateral issues, and significantly increase the cost of trial."); Porter v. State,
94 Nev. 142, 148, 576 P.2d 275, 278-79 (1978).
99. Gorman, supra note 16, at 145. See also United States v. Thevis, 665
F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
100. Generally, most courts have not hesitated to exclude expert testimony
based on these reasons. However, others have been more reluctant. See Francis,
390 Mass. at 100, 453 N.E.2d at 1210 ("[T]hese reasons alone would not justify
the exclusion of evidence that would assist a trier of fact.").
101. See infra notes 221-36 and accompanying text.
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picious eyewitness testimony by the trial court,1°2 opportunity for cross-
examination, making closing arguments, giving cautionary instructions, and
grant of a motion for new trial if the trial court deems the identification
evidence too unreliable.103 Unfortunately, the two procedural devices most
often relied upon by courts in excluding such evidence-cross-examination
and closing argument-cannot attain their full protective character without
the admission of the expert testimony.1 4
Finally, some jurisdictions exclude expert psychological testimony be-
cause they believe it entails novel scientific evidence and fails to meet the
standard for admissibility set forth in Frye v. United States'os or a similar
test. The Frye test requires that the underlying scientific principles "must
be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs."'0
Much disagreement exists concerning the validity of the Frye test and
its exact meaning. 0 7 Regardless, many courts continue to adhere to it.o8
102. Although trial courts have the authority to exclude suspicious eyewitness
testimony, they rarely do. Eyewitness testimony would most often be found sus-
picious when the police have used suggestive identification procedures in line-ups
or photographic displays. Yet, as long as the prosecution can demonstrate that the
in-court identification has a source independent from the previous suggestive pretrial
confrontation, courts typically will not exclude the eyewitness testimony. See Manson
v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 106-07 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198-200
(1972); McCoumcK, supra note 32, § 174, at 494-96. The Supreme Court has
decided only one case where it determined that eyewitness testimony was erroneously
admitted in spite of its suspicious nature. See Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440
(1969); McCoIuncK, supra note 32, § 174, at 495-96.
One commentator argues that exclusion of eyewitness testimony apart from
suggestive pretrial identification should serve as a "last resort" because such ex-
clusion would prevent conviction of the truly guilty. Woocher, supra note 13, at
1000-01. Eyewitness evidence is often the only means of linking defendants to
crimes and even unreliable identifications are preferable to none, since the iden-
tification could actually be accurate. Id.
103. Johnson, supra note 13, at 951-55; Sanders, supra note 22, at 1464-68;
Lane, supra note 3, at 1360-63; Walters, supra note 16, at 1403; Woocher, supra
note 13, at 1000-05.
104. The deficiencies of these two procedural devices are discussed more fully
in Section V, which analyzes State v. Lawhorn. See infra notes 221-30 and ac-
companying text.
105. Frye v. United States, 293 F.2d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See also Gorman,
supra note 16, at 142-44; Woocher, supra note 13, at 1021-23.
106. Frye, 293 F.2d at 1014.
107. Gorman, supra note 16, at 143-44.
108. Id. at 144. Missouri courts generally adhere to the Frye test in admitting
new methods of scientific analysis. R. HASL & J. O'BPIN, MissouRI LAW OF
EViDENCE §§ 9-10, 10-18, at 131, 165-66 (1984). See also Alsbach v. Bader, 700
S.W.2d 823, 828 (Mo. 1985) (en banc) ("This court has explicitly adopted the Frye
standard for determining the admissibility of new scientific techniques."); State v.
Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235, 239 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) ("[A]dmission of scientific
evidence depends on wide acceptance in the relevant scientific community of its
15
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Some courts have explicitly rejected expert psychological testimony due to
its perceived failure to meet the Frye test.1°9 Yet, some jurisdictions following
Frye have determined that such testimony meets the general acceptability
standard." 0
The requirement that expert psychological testimony meet a Frye-type
test has diminished in importance in recent decisions."' One commentator
stated: "It begins to appear that arguments over the admission of eyewitness
expert testimony may now begin to focus not on the scientific worth of
the testimony in general but on its probative force and its prejudicial
effect."' 12 Apparently, this is the trend in Missouri. None of the Missouri
appellate decisions have mentioned the Frye test as a ground for exclusion
of expert psychological testimony. Rather, they have argued that such
testimony is not a proper subject for the jury."'
III. OvERviw: TREATMENT OF EXPERT PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY IN
OTHER JURISDICTIONS
An appellate court may choose from four potential rulings whenever
it considers the admissibility of expert psychological testimony: (1) per se
reliability.") (citations omitted); State v. Ross, 523 S.W.2d 841, 845 (Mo. Ct. App.
1975) (applied Frye-type standard to neutron activation analysis).
109. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1985); United
States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 383 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Watson, 587
F.2d 365, 369 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979); People v.
Plascencia, 168 Cal. App. 3d 546, 554, 214 Cal. Rptr. 316, 320 (1985); People v.
Brown, 117 Misc. 2d 587, 594, 459 N.Y.S.2d 227, 232 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1983).
110. United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 1107 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 868 (1984) ("The day may have arrived ... when [the expert's] testimony
can be said to conform to a generally accepted explanatory theory."); People v.
McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 372-73, 690 P.2d 709, 723-24, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236,
250-51 (1984) (the defendant failed to persuade the court that expert psychological
testimony was "scientific enough" for admissibility); Bloodsworth v. State, 307
Md. 164, 184-85, 512 A.2d 1056, 1066 (1986) (Frye does not apply to expert
psychological testimony); People v. Brooks, 128 Misc. 2d 608, 620, 490 N.Y.S.2d
692, 701 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1985) ("The fact that this type of testimony is somewhat
novel should not preclude its admission into evidence."); State v. Taylor, 50 Wash.
App. 481, 488, 749 P.2d 181, 184 (1988) (State did not challenge the acceptability
of expert psychological testimony under Frye).
111. N. SOBEL, supra note 12, § 9.6(b). See, e.g., United States v. Downing,
753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 868 (1984); State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208
(1983); People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 690 P.2d 709, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236
(1984).
112. N. SOBEL, supra note 12, § 9.6(b). Another commentator declares that
"recent cases on expert testimony seem to ignore the Frye test altogether and to
apply only the requirements of proper subject matter and qualified expert." Woocher,
supra note 13, at 1022.
113. See infra notes 195-218 and accompanying text. 16
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 3 [1989], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/9
1989] EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS
admissibility; (2) traditional discretionary admissibility; (3) modified dis-
cretionary admissibility; and (4) per se inadmissibility. Categories one and
four are straightforward and self-explanatory. Apparently, no court has
yet ruled expert psychological testimony per se admissible, and so far only
one court has ruled such testimony per se inadmissible-State v. Whitmill.'1 4
Category two allows a trial court to exercise its sound discretion to exclude
such evidence. In doing so, a court draws upon its prior experience and
knowledge of the facts in the particular case. One can further partition
this category into subcategories with either a positive or negative bias
toward admissibility. The majority of jurisdictions adopt the category two
approach with a negative bias against admissibility. Category three permits
the trial court to freely exercise its discretion in admitting the expert
testimony except in a limited class of cases in which the court is required
to admit it. Courts assuming this approach usually delineate those elements
necessary to qualify the case for per se admissibility. People v. McDonald"5
clearly falls into this category.
A. The Majority View
The majority of appellate courts have affirmed trial court exclusion
of expert psychological testimony based on a variety of reasons.11 6 As noted,
114. No. 30-472 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 3, 1989). See infra notes 237-59 and
accompanying text for an extensive analysis of this decision.
115. 37 Cal. 3d 351, 690 P.2d 709, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1984).
116. United States v. Dowling, 855 F.2d 114, 118-19 (3rd Cir. 1988) (proffered
expert testimony lacked proper "fit" between the facts of the case and the general
principles to which the expert psychologist would have testified plus very short
notice given that defendant would proffer such testimony); United States v. Blade,
811 F.2d 461, 464-65 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Langsfield, 802 F.2d 1176,
1179-80 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Poole, 794 F.2d 462, 468 (9th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Brewer, 783 F.2d 841, 843 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 831
(1986); United States v. Purham, 725 F.2d 450, 454 (8th Cir. 1984); United States
v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641-42 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Sims, 617 F.2d
1371, 1374-75 (9th Cir. 1980) (not error for trial court to fail to appoint psychologist
to assist defense through testimony on eyewitness identification); United States v.
Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 384 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Watson, 587 F.2d 365,
369 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1100 (1979); United States v. Brown,
501 F.2d 146, 150-51 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United
States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975); United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148,
1152-53 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Collins, 395 F. Supp. 629, 637 (M.D.
Pa.), aff'd, 523 F.2d 1051 (3rd Cir. 1975); Dunbar v. State, 677 P.2d 1275, 1279
(Alaska Ct. App. 1984) (excluded videotaped testimony of expert psychological
witness because defendant failed to demonstrate that the expert was unavailable);
State v. Poland, 144 Ariz. 388, -, 698 P.2d 183, 194 (1985); State v. Rodriquez,
145 Ariz. 157, -, 700 P.2d 855, 866 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (the facts of the
case constituted the "usual" situation, which Chapple held was within trial court
discretion); Caldwell v. State, 267 Ark. 1053, 1061, 594 S.W.2d 24, 28-29 (Ark.
Ct. App. 1980); People v. Walker, 41 Cal. 3d 116, -, 711 P.2d 465, 473, 222
17
Hamilton: Hamilton: Expert Testimony on the Reliability of Eyewitness Identifications
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
750 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54
appellate courts have almost universally affirmed exclusion based on the
trial court's discretionary authority. Several factors, however, weaken the
precedential value of this majority view, despite its apparent strength and
persuasiveness. First, the actual propensity of trial courts to admit such
testimony is difficult to discern from the appellate decisions. Expert psy-
chological testimony is virtually always offered by the defendant."' Where
the trial court admits such testimony, the issue of admissibility will not
arise on appeal; the defendant cannot challenge the admission of his own
evidence if he is convicted and no appeal is permitted if he is acquitted."'
Therefore, appellate courts face the issue only when the trial court has
Cal. Rptr. 169, 171 (1985) (facts do not fit within the McDonald criteria that
qualify a case for mandatory admission of expert psychological testimony; trial
court allowed to use its discretion in admitting such testimony); People v. Plascencia,
168 Cal. App. 3d 546, 554-55, 214 Cal. Rptr. 316, 320 (1985) (facts do not fit
within the McDonald criteria); People v. Beaver, 725 P.2d 96, 99-100 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1986); People v. Lawson, 37 Colo. App. 442, -, 551 P.2d 206, 209 (1976);
State v. Kemp, 199 Conn. 473, 479, 507 A.2d 1387, 1390 (1986); Taylor v. United
States, 451 A.2d 859, 867 (D.C. 1982); Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827, 832
(D.C. 1977); Hooper v. State, 476 So. 2d 1253, 1257 (Fla. 1985); Johnson v. State,
438 So. 2d 774, 777 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 (1984); Porter v.
State, 188 Ga. App. 675, -, 373 S.E.2d 805, 807 (1988); State v. Hoisington,
104 Idaho 153, -, 657 P.2d 17, 29 (1983); People v. Clark, 124 Il1. App. 3d
14, 22, 463 N.E.2d 981, 987 (1984); People v. Brown, 110 I11. App. 3d 1125, 1129-
30, 443 N.E.2d 665, 668 (1982); People v. Johnson, 97 Ill. App. 3d 1055, 1069,
423 N.E.2d 1206, 1216-17 (1981); People v. Dixon, 87 Ill. App. 3d 814, 818, 410
N.E.2d 252, 256 (1980); State v. Wheaton, 240 Kan. 345, 349-52, 729 P.2d 1183,
1186-88 (1986); State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 395, 635 P.2d 1236, 1243 (1981)
(expert psychological testimony is not the answer; the use of cautionary identification
instruction is a better solution for mistaken identifications; when required by the
facts, it is error not to give such an instruction when eyewitness testimony is
admitted at trial); State v. Stucke, 419 So. 2d 939, 945 (La. 1982); State v. Coleman,
486 So. 2d 995, 1000 (La. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Fernald, 397 A.2d 194, 197
(Me. 1979); Bloodsworth v. State, 307 Md. 164, 186, 512 A.2d 1056, 1066-67 (Md.
Ct. App. 1986); Commonwealth v. Francis, 390 Mass. 89, 101, 453 N.E.2d 1204,
1207-11 (1983); Commonwealth v. Jones, 363 Mass. 497, 502, 287 N.E.2d 599,
602-03 (1972); State v. Helterbridle, 301 N.W.2d 545, 547 (Minn. 1980); State v.
Whitmill, No. 30-472, slip op. at 6 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 3, 1989); State v. Ammons,
208 Neb. 812, 815, 305 N.W.2d 812, 814 (1981); Porter v. State, 94 Nev. 142,
148, 576 P.2d 275, 278-79 (1988); People v. Brown, 117 Misc. 2d 587, 594, 459
N.Y.S.2d 227, 232 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1983); People v. Valentine, 53 A.D.2d 832, 833,
385 N.Y.S.2d 545, 546 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976); State v. Schroeder, 62 Or. App.
331, 340, 661 P.2d 111, 118 (1983); State v. Porrar, 121 R.I. 882, 892-93, 404
A.2d 465, 471 (1979); State v. Wooden, 658 S.W.2d 553, 556-57 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1983); Thomas v. State, 748 S.W.2d 539, 540-41 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988); State
v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 61 (Utah 1982); State v. Onorato, 142 Vt. 99, 105,
453 A.2d 393, 395-96 (1982); State v. Guloy, 104 Wash. 2d 412, 430, 705 P.2d
1182, 1193 (1985) (en bane).
117. People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 365 n.10, 690 P.2d 709, 718 n.10,
208 Cal. Rptr. 236, 245 n.10 (1984).
118. Id. 18
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excluded the testimony. 119 The deferential treatment given to a trial court's
discretionary exclusion exacerbates the problem by creating the appearance
of general disapproval'2 0 Several appellate opinions, however, indicate that
the expert psychological testimony was actually admitted at the trial court
level.' 2' Second, some appellate courts which have confronted the issue
have ruled that any error resulting from exclusion was harmless. 2 2 These
harmless error decisions are misleading because the courts have not directly
addressed the admissibility of the testimony, yet their holdings affirm trial
court exclusions. Finally, the precedential value of the majority view is
most undermined by the development of a modern trend among appellate
courts favoring admissibility.
B. The Modern Trend
The emergence of a recent trend supporting the admissibility of expert
psychological testimony has seriously challenged the long-standing majority
view. In 1983, State v. Chapple2 1 became the first appellate decision to
hold that the exclusion of such testimony constituted reversible error as
an abuse of discretion. 24 The People v. McDonald125 decision reached a
similar conclusion one year later. Several other appellate courts have also
favored such expert testimony. 2 6 A brief review of these two seminal
119. Id.
120. Id.; McCOrMICK, supra note 32, § 206, at 623 n.7.
121. United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1240 (9th Cir. 1981); State v.
Kay, 701 P.2d 281, 287 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985); People v. Brown, 110 II. App.
3d 1125, 1129, 443 N.E.2d 665, 668 (1982); State v. Chapman, 410 So. 2d 689,
702 (La. 1981); State v. Sellars, 52 N.C. App. 380, 400-02, 278 S.E.2d 907, 921-
22 (1981); Bristol v. State, 764 P.2d 887, 890 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988); Hampton
v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 450, 455, 285 N.W.2d 868, 870-71 (1979). Dr. Elizabeth Loftus
has testified in over 160 trials (3/4 of which have been criminal trials) in 30 states,
while Dr. Robert Buckhout has testified in 82 cases in 20 states and 4 federal
jurisdictions. Dr. Buckhout indicated that his testimony is now hardly ever denied
in New York state courts. Telephone interview with Dr. Robert Buckhout, Professor
of Psychology, Brooklyn College, Brooklyn, New York (April 4, 1989).
In addition, Missouri trial courts have admitted such expert testimony on
several occasions. See State v. Saunders, No. 85-1462 (Jackson Co. Cir. Ct. Oct.
23, 1986) (unreported state court decision); State v. Marcus, No. 38-3562 (Green
Co. Cir. Ct. Nov. 13, 1983) (unreported state court decision); State v. Taylor, No.
18-0238 (Platt Co. Cir. Ct. Dec. 15, 1981) (unreported state court decision).
122. United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 1107 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 868 (1984); People v. Jackson, 164 Cal. App. 3d 224, 240-41, 210 Cal.
Rptr. 680, 690 (1985); State v. Cooper, 708 S.W.2d 299, 303 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
123. 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983).
124. Id. at -, 660 P.2d at 1224.
125. 37 Cal. 3d 351, 690 P.2d 709, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1984).
126. United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, 1311-12 (5th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1229-32 (3rd Cir. 1985); United States v. Smith,
736 F.2d 1103, 1105-07 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 868 (1984); Chapple, 135
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decisions is necessary to fully comprehend the current status of the law
on this issue.
State v. Chapple involved a homicide prosecution in which the defen-
dant's conviction hinged on two eyewitness identifications. The Arizona
Supreme Court emphasized several factors that it felt cast doubt on the
reliability of the identifications. 27 The court distinguished cases affirming
the exclusion of expert psychological testimony because the particular facts
of Chapple were so compelling.1 8 It also rejected arguments that it should
exclude such expert testimony because its prejudicial effect outweighed its
probative value or because it was not a proper subject for the jury. 2 9 The
supreme court held that the testimony would have "significant[ly] assist[ed]"
the jury, 30 but concluded "while we have no problem with the usual
Ariz. at -, 660 P.2d at 1223-24; McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d at 367-69, 690 P.2d
at 720-21, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 247-48; State v. Galloway, 275 N.W.2d 736, 738-39
(Iowa 1979); People v. Brooks, 128 Misc. 2d 608, -, 490 N.Y.S.2d 692, 702
(N.Y. Co. Ct. 1985); People v. Lewis, 137 Misc. 2d 84, 86-87, 520 N.Y.S.2d 125,
127 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1987) (exercised discretion and allowed expert psychological
testimony, provided it is limited to general principles); State v. Buell, 22 Ohio St.
3d 124, 129-33, 489 N.E.2d 795, 801-04, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871 (1986); Brown
v. State, 689 S.W.2d 219, 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); State v. Taylor, 50 Wash.
App. 481, 488-90, 749 P.2d 181, 184-85 (1988); State v. Johnson, 49 Wash. App.
432, 438-40, 743 P.2d 290, 293-94 (1987); State v. Hanson, 46 Wash. App. 656,
671, 731 P.2d 1140, 1149 (1987); State v. Moon, 45 Wash. App. 692, 696-99, 726
P.2d 1263, 1266-67 (1986) (exclusion of expert psychological testimony is an abuse
of discretion where the identification of the defendant is the principle issue at trial,
the defendant presents an alibi defense and little or no other evidence links defendant
to the crime); State v. Hamm, 146 Wis. 2d 130, 142-46, 430 N.W.2d 584, 590-91
(Wis. Ct. App. 1988), appeal denied, 436 N.W.2d 30 (1988) (trial court exclusion
of expert psychological testimony is an abuse of discretion because the trial judge
had heard no testimony from the expert and, therefore, lacked a factual basis for
ruling, otherwise the decision is within the trial judge's discretion); Hampton v.
State, 92 Wis. 2d 450, 455-61, 285 N.W.2d 868, 871-73 (1979) (trial court permitted
expert psychologist to list various factors affecting human perception, however,
held such testimony is not admissible per se).
127. These factors were: the eyewitnesses were co-participants in a drug sale,
both had smoked marijuana on the day of the homicides, neither was previously
acquainted with the defendant, both observed the defendant only during the drug
sale and homicides-very stressful events, and their identifications were made from
a photographic display over one year after their brief encounter with the defendant.
Chapple, 135 Ariz. at -, 660 P.2d at 1217.
128. Id. at -, 660 P.2d at 1218-19.
129. Id. at -, 660 P.2d at 1219-24. The court was actually applying two
of the four criteria outlined in United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th
Cir. 1973), for determining admissibility of such testimony: (1) qualified expert;
(2) proper subject; (3) conformity to a generally accepted explanatory theory; and
(4) probative value compared to prejudicial effect. The court had determined that
the issues of the qualification of the expert and conformity to accepted theory
were not in question. Chapple, 135 Ariz. at -, 660 P.2d at 1218-19.
130. Id. at -, 660 P.2d at 1224.
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discretionary ruling that the trier of fact needs no assistance from [expert
psychological testimony], the unusual facts of this case compel the contrary
conclusion."' 31
Chapple neither rejected the traditional grant of discretionary authority
nor adopted a per se rule of admissibility. Chapple clearly falls within the
category two, positive bias class. Chapple is significant in that it is the
first appellate decision to recognize that admission of such evidence is
sometimes required; exclusion in certain factual situations constitutes an
abuse of discretion.
People v. McDonald32 also involved a murder prosecution where eye-
witness identification was the sole evidence linking the defendant to the
crime. 3 3 The prosecution presented seven eyewitnesses who, with varying
degrees of certainty, identified the defendant.3 4 One of the prosecution's
own witnesses, however, unequivocally testified that the defendant was not
the perpetrator. 3 Furthermore, the defense presented six alibi witnesses
who testified the defendant was in another state at the time of the crime.' 36
The California Supreme Court rejected the "invasion of the jury's
province" argument and refused to apply the Frye test to such testimony. 137
Moreover, it declared that "although jurors may not be totally unaware
of the ... psychological factors bearing on eyewitness identification, the
body of information now available on these matters is 'sufficiently beyond
common experience' that in appropriate cases expert opinion thereon could
at least 'assist the trier of fact."" 3 " The court reiterated that the decision
to admit such testimony remains "primarily a matter within the trial court's
131. Id. at -, 660 P.2d at 1223. Note that Arizona has adopted an expert
witness rule identical to FED. R. Evrn. 702, which is a more lenient standard of
admissibility than some state standards. See, e.g., Chapple, 135"Ariz. at -, 660
P.2d at 1218. See infra note 203 for the text of Fed. R. Evid. 702.
132. People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 690 P.2d 709, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236
(1984).
133. Id. at 355-60, 690 P.2d at 711-14, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 238-41. The defense
offered six alibi witnesses who testified that the defendant was out of state at the
time of the murder.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 358-59, 690 P.2d at 714, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 241.
136. Id. at 360, 690 P.2d at 714, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 241.
137. Id. at 371-72, 690 P.2d at 722-23, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 249-50.
138. Id. at 369, 690 P.2d at 721, 208 Cal. Rptr. at - (footnote omitted).
The court quoted from Rule 801 of the California Evidence Code, which enunciates
the standard for admission of expert testimony in California:
If a witness is testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of an
opinion is limited to such an opinion as is:
(a) Related to a subject that is sufficiently beyond common experience
that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact ..
CAL. Evm. CODE § 801 (West 1966).
This standard is a slightly more stringent standard than FED. R. Evm. 702.
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discretion" and that "such evidence will not often be needed."' 13 9 The
court, nevertheless, held:
When an eyewitness identification of the defendant is a key element of
the prosecution's case but is not substantially corroborated by evidence
giving it independent reliability, and the defendant offers qualified expert
testimony on specific psychological factors shown by the record that could
have affected the accuracy of the identification but are not likely to be
fully known to or understood by the jury, it will ordinarily be error to
exclude that testimony. 1'4
The McDonald rule falls within the purview of category three. The
opinion not only reversed the exclusion of the expert psychological testimony
but also moved much farther toward an absolute rule of per se admissibility
than did Chapple.
IV. PAST TREATMENT OF EXPERT PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTrMONY iN
MISSOURI
Missouri appellate courts in the eastern and western districts have
previously considered the admissibility of expert psychological testimony in
two decisions-State v. Bullington (western district)'4' and State v. Cooper
(eastern district). 42 Neither district determined the issue authoritatively or
unequivocally since neither directly confronted the issue. 43 A brief review
of these two decisions is instructive in analyzing the admissibility of expert
psychological testimony in Missouri.
A. State v. Bullington
The Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, dealt with the topic
of expert psychological testimony in State v. Bullington. 44 The court af-
139. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d at 377, 690 P.2d at 727, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 254.
140. Id.
141. 680 S.W.2d 238 (Mo. Ct. App.) (western district), conviction overturned,
684 S.W.2d 52 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
142. 708 S.W.2d 299 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (eastern district).
143. State v. Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d 820, 822 (Mo. 1988) (en bane).
144. 680 S.W.2d 238 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). Bullington involved a defendant
charged with first degree murder and first degree burglary. The defendant broke
into the victim's home, tied up two of the residents (the mother and brother of
the victim), taped their eyes shut, threatened to kill them and took hostage an
eighteen year old girl who was later found dead. The two eyewitnesses identified
Robert Bullington as the perpetrator and estimated that they observed him between
twenty seconds and five minutes during the ordeal. State v. Bullington, 684 S.W.2d
52, 53 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
Additional corroborating evidence linked the defendant to the crime. For
instance, the defendant was seen in the victim's neighborhood on the evening of
the incident, a white truck similar to the defendant's was seen parked in front of
the victim's house on the evening of the incident and the defendant mentioned to
others on two occasions that the police were pursuing him. Id.
At trial, the defense sought to introduce expert psychological testimony related
to the factors affecting the reliability of eyewitness identifications. However, the
trial judge excluded the testimony. Id. at 55.
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firmed the exclusion of the expert psychological testimony. The holding,
however, turned on the defense's insufficient offer of proof, which consisted
of a brief narrative statement by the defense concerning the nature of the
expert's testimony rather than the preferred question-and-answer interro-
gation of the expert from the witness stand. 145 Because the appellate court
felt it lacked an adequate record of the expert's proposed testimony, it
refused to "undertake the formulation of an opinion on a matter of first
impression in the state without a more substantial basis from which to
proceed."1
46
In dicta, the court relied on the argument that such testimony is an
improper subject because it invades the province of the jury. 47 This ar-
gument stems from the idea that the testimony is a comment on the
credibility of another witness's testimony. 48 In the western district's opinion,
admissibility of such expert evidence should be left to the trial judge's
discretion due to its doubtful probative value. 149
The court strongly implied that it would have deferred to the trial
court's broad discretion if it had directly addressed the admissibility of
the testimony. Therefore, Bullington fits into the category two, negative
bias class. Although Buffington failed to conclusively address the issue, it
provided dicta for the supreme court's consideration in State v. Lawhorn.
B. State v. Cooper
The Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, likewise dealt with
the issue in State v. Cooper.'10 Yet, the court indicated it did not need
145. Id. at 55; Buffington, 680 S.W.2d at 244. Although both forms are
acceptable, the question and answer form is preferred. Id. at 243. See State v.
Sullivan, 553 S.W.2d 510, 513 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977). If the offer of proof is a
narrative summation, it must be definite, specific and set out the content of the
testimony to demonstrate its admissibility. Bullington, 680 S.W.2d at 243. See also
McMillin v. McMillin, 633 S.W.2d 223, 225 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). When a party
uses the narrative statement form, there is a risk that the reviewing court will find
the offer insufficient. Bullington, 680 S.W.2d at 243-44; Stapleton v. Griewe, 602
S.W.2d 810, 813 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
146. Bullington, 680 S.W.2d at 243-44.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 244 (citing State v. Hensley, 655 S.W.2d 810 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983)
and State v. Evans, 637 S.W.2d 62 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)).
150. 708 S.W.2d 299 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (eastern district). The decision
involved a conviction for first degree robbery and armed criminal action. A black
man, armed with a pistol and carrying a canvas bag, robbed a supermarket then
fled. Three customers followed the perpetrator out of the store; two observed him
drive away in a car and immediately provided the license number and a description
of the car to the police. Within minutes, the police located a car matching the
description and license number. Officers found a pistol and canvas bag in the car,
1989]
23
Hamilton: Hamilton: Expert Testimony on the Reliability of Eyewitness Identifications
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
to "rule upon the admissibility of the proffered testimony because, under
the particular facts presented, any error committed by the trial court was
necessarily harmless.' '5 1
Although it declined ruling on the admissibility of such expert evidence,
the court analyzed the relevant Missouri law and summarized the prevailing
law in other jurisdictions. The opinion relied on State v. Taylor'12 for the
standard applicable to the admission of expert testimony in Missouri. 53
The eastern district indicated, as had the western district in Bullington,
that the majority of courts tenaciously exclude expert psychological testi-
mony. 154 Unlike Bullington, however, it also acknowledged that a "modern
trend favors admissibility of such evidence.' '5 5
According to the court, the exclusion was harmless "because the ev-
idence overwhelmingly established the defendant's guilt."' t5 6 Considering the
abundance of corroborating evidence, the expert testimony would not have
offered much assistance to the jury. Even with the expert psychological
testimony, the jury would still have convicted the defendant. Therefore,
the exclusion was harmless.1 7
Nevertheless, the eastern district proceeded further and stated in dicta
that even if such evidence were admissible in Missouri, the decision to
which were later identified as those used in the crime. The officers then quickly
drove two of the witnesses to the stopped car; these witnesses identified the defendant
as the robber. Three other eyewitnesses identified the defendant at a lineup the
next morning. However, only two were able to positively identify the defendant
at trial. The trial judge refused to admit the defense's proffered expert psychological
testimony based on "invasion of the jury's province." Id. at 301-02.
On appeal, the eastern district avoided the offer of proof problem involved
in Bullington because the trial court had conducted a complete voir dire examination
of the expert. The expert, Dr. Joseph Fitzgerald, indicated he would have testified
to: (1) cross-racial identification factors; (2) the effect of stress on the ability to
perceive and remember; (3) the tendency of memory to fade over time (the forgetting
curve); (4) the unconscious transfer of other feelings or events to the observed
event; (5) the lack of correlation between the eyewitness' confidence in his iden-
tification and his actual accuracy; and (6) memory techniques used to enhance
recollection. Id. This proffer established that the expert intended to tailor his
testimony so as to avoid comment on the specific facts involved in the case or on
the credibility of any particular witness' testimony. Id. at 303.
151. Id.
152. 663 S.W.2d 235 (Mo. 1984).
153. Cooper, 708 S.W.2d at 302. See infra notes 200-04 and accompanying
text.
154. Id. at 303.
155. Id. (citations omitted).
156. Id. The evidence included five eyewitnesses and substantial corroborating
evidence. In addition, the defendant was apprehended just minutes after the incident,
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admit it remained in the trial court's sound discretion.' 58 The tone of
Cooper indicates that it belongs in the category two, positive bias class. 159
V. ANALYSIS OF STATE V. LAwvIopNI
A. The Facts
On November 28, 1986, Eric Jensen, the sole occupant of a fraternity
house on the University of Missouri-Columbia campus, awakened when a
black man poked his head into Jensen's bedroom. Jensen observed the
man for "just a second" at a distance of ten to fifteen feet then followed
him into a well-lighted hallway.' 6' Jensen conversed with the intruder for
two and one-half to five minutes until he noticed that several stereo
components were missing from a nearby room.' 62 As the intruder took
flight, Jensen observed him getting into a maroon Honda automobile and
noted the license plate number.' 6 He provided the police with a detailed
description of the intruder and the automobile.' 64
A police officer soon located the vehicle and the appellant at a nearby
house.' 65 Appellant donned a hood and glasses when Jensen attempted to
identify him approximately fifteen minutes after the incident.' 66 Jensen
tentatively recognized both appellant's face and voice as the intruder's, but
was not certain due to the attempted disguise.' 67 Later the same afternoon,
Jensen viewed a photographic array containing appellant's photograph and
positively identified appellant as the burglar.' 6
At trial, the defense presented an extensive in camera offer of proof
concerning the proposed expert testimony of Dr. Alvin Goldstein, a psy-
chology professor at the University of Missouri-Columbia. 69 Although La-
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. 762 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
161. Supplemental Brief for Respondent at 4, State v. Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d
820 (Mo. 1988).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 5.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 3.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 6.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 25. The offer indicated Dr. Goldstein was well-trained in human
visual perception, particularly in face and voice recognition. Id. at 7. The proffer
further indicated that Dr. Goldstein intended to testify to the "inherent difficulty
in cross-racial eyewitness identification, that post-confrontation events affect the
witness' perception of what has occurred and that no correlation exists between a
witness' confidence in his identification and the correctness of the identification."
Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d at 822. He would also have testified that stress adversely
affects memory. Brief of Appellant at 22, State v. Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d 820 (Mo.
1988). The trial court rejected the proffered testimony because "(1) [it] was not
established as generally accepted in the scientific community; and (2) the proffered
hypotheticals would 'clearly invade the province of the jury."' Supplemental Brief
of Respondent, supra note 161, at 26.
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whom presented an alibi defense, the jury convicted him of first-degree
burglary, and the court sentenced him to a seven year term as a prior
offender under Section 558.019 of the Missouri Revised Statutes. 170
B. The Appellate Court Decision
The Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, affirmed the exclusion
of the expert psychological testimony.' It noted that both State v. Bul-
lington and State v. Cooper had previously considered the admissibility of
expert psychological testimony, but recognized that neither case had directly
addressed the issue.172 The court also acknowledged State v. Chapple and
People v. McDonald as representative of a "modern trend" favoring ad-
mission of such testimony. Nevertheless, the court found more impressive
the number of cases from other jurisdictions denying admission., The
appellate court concluded that both decisions preserved the traditional rule
granting the trial judge broad discretion in admitting expert psychological
testimony.' 74 It emphasized that the factors which render eyewitness iden-
tification suspect are within the common knowledge of jurors and hy-
pothesized that the only situation in which a defendant might need such
expert testimony would be "where the facts gave little or no other ground
upon which to argue.' ' 71 The court declared, however, that this is "not
170. Mo. REv. STAT. § 558.019 (1986). Although on appeal appellant chal-
lenged his sentencing under the prior offender statute, this Note will not address
the issue. Generally, appellant claimed that application of the statute was uncon-
stitutional as a violation of the prohibition against ex post facto laws contained
in the United States Constitution, article I, section 10 and the Missouri Constitution,
article I, section 13. Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d at 824. The charged offense occurred
on November 28, 1986, however, the effective date of the statute was January 1,
1987. Id.
The Missouri Supreme Court held the trial court erred in sentencing appellant
as a prior offender under the statute and remanded for sentencing according to
the "guidelines governing parole eligibility in place when appellant committed the
offense." Id. at 826.
171. State v. Lawhorn, No. 39-524 (Mo. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 1988) (WESTLAW
135419) (unreported western district decision). The Missouri Supreme Court granted
transfer of this case. According to Mo. SUP. CT. R. 30.27, the Supreme Court
has original jurisdiction when it grants a transfer to hear cases filed in a district
of the Missouri Court of Appeals. Therefore, appellate court decisions written prior
to transfer are not typically published in the permanent law reports. Thus, the
Lawhorn appellate court decision will not be reported. See also 19 WEST'S MIssouRI
PRACTICE MANUAL § 612 (1985).
172. Lawhorn, No. 39-524, slip op. at 3.
173. Id. at 5.
174. Id. at 4. However, the court noted that, in some instances, the McDonald
court would always require admission of expert psychological testimony and cited
the three-factor test adopted by McDonald. Id. at 5.
175. Id. at 6.
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the theory which Chapple and McDonald embrace. ' 176 Furthermore, the
court indicated that counsel can discuss potential inaccuracies in closing
argument. 177
Absent controlling Missouri authority, the court indicated it felt con-
strained to hold that the admission of expert psychological testimony is
discretionary. 78 Adopting a three-part test, it held:
[A] trial court may in the exercise of its discretion admit such evidence
in a criminal prosecution if the principal issue in the case is identification
of the defendant, if the identification is also in some manner suspect and
is not corroborated by other evidence and if the proffered witness is
properly qualified as an expert in the field. This result leaves to the trialjudge the appraisal of the facts in each case.' 79
Applying this holding, the court determined that the facts of the case did
not warrant admission of the testimony.8 0
The tenor of the appellate decision was one of general disapproval of
the admissibility of such testimony. In fact, the court implied that such
expert testimony is generally inadmissible, despite the trial court's discre-
tionary authority. This implication arises from the court's statements that
although "such evidence [is not] always inadmissible, . . . it appears the
facts of this case do not present a situation in which admission ...
warranted -consideration as an issue for discretionary decision,"'' and
"[n]one of the factors which could persuade a trial judge to admit [expert
psychological testimony] was present and thus, no discretionary choice was
to be made."' 82 Furthermore, the holding implied that courts should admit
such testimony solely in situations which satisfy the three-part test adopted
by the court. In other words, only when the three-part analysis is satisfied
should the trial court exercise its discretion in admitting expert psychological
testimony. Otherwise, the implication is that such testimony is per se
inadmissible. This approach is an odd combination of category three,
negative bias and category four.
176. Id. This author contends that this is, at least partially, the theory the
McDonald court had in mind when it adopted its three-part test. The requirements
that identification be a key element and that there be a lack of substantial cor-
roboration implicitly revolves around the theory that the facts provide little ground
on which to argue.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 7 (emphasis added). Interestingly, this holding is very similar to
the three-part McDonald test that the appellate court disparaged throughout its
opinion. See supra note 140 and accompanying text for the McDonald test.
180. Id.
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C. The Supreme Court Decision
The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the conviction upon transfer. 8 '
In framing the scope of its opinion, the court declared that the case
"squarely" presented the issue of admissibility of expert psychological
testimony. 84 Furthermore, the court recognized that it was addressing the
issue as one of first impression.8 5 Like the court of appeals, the supreme
court recognized that both State v. Bullington and State v. Cooper had
considered the issue, but due to the circumstances involved in each, neither
had ruled the question "authoritatively and unequivocally."' 8 6 Unlike Bul-
lington, appellant's counsel had made a full offer of proof expounding
the substance of the proposed testimony.'87 Appellant's identification was
the key element upon which the jury based the conviction; the prosecution
presented no corroborating evidence, unlike the Cooper prosecution.,88
The supreme court cited State v. Chapple and People v. McDonald
as indicative of the modern trend favoring admission of such expert tes-
timony. 89 The court attempted to distinguish these two landmark decisions
but only briefly reviewed their holdings.190 Regarding Chapple, the court
stated that its particular facts rendered the eyewitness identification "suf-
ficiently suspect" to require admission of the expert testimony.' 9' The court
observed that McDonald left intact the traditional rule granting discretion
to the trial judge except in those limited instances where three variables
are satisfied. 92 Cursorily dismissing both holdings, the court stated, "Neither
McDonald nor Chapple have been widely followed."' 9
The supreme court affirmed the exclusion of the testimony based on
two factors: (1) expert psychological testimony is not a proper subject for
the jury; and (2) procedural safeguards are sufficient protections against
misidentification. Both are among the standard reasons advanced by courts
to justify exclusion of such expert evidence. 94
183. Id. at 1.







191. Id. See supra notes 123, 127-31 and accompanying text for more complete
analysis of Chapple.
192. Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d at 822. See supra notes 125, 132-40 and accom-
panying text for more complete analysis of McDonald.
193. Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d at 822.
194. See supra notes 89-113 and accompanying text for complete discussion
of these and other standard reasons for exclusion.
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1. Proper Subject for Jury
The supreme court believed that all the principles to be presented by
the expert were "within the general realm of common experience of members
of a jury and [could] be evaluated without an expert's assistance."' 95 In
State v. Brooks, the Missouri Court of Appeals stressed that the jury has
the responsibility of weighing eyewitness credibility. 96 Allowing expert psy-
chological testimony on matters within the jury's common knowledge would
impermissibly invade its province. 97 According to the court's reasoning,
an expert psychologist essentially tells the jury whether it should believe
the eyewitness testimony. Yet, the jury is entitled to any information which
might significantly bear on the credibility or veracity of a witness. 98
The full extent of this argument is not easily discernible from the
opinion. It was implied, however, when the court briefly pointed out that
"[e]xpert testimony is also inadmissible if it relates to the credibility of
witnesses, for this constitutes an invasion of the province of the jury."' 99
The supreme court gleaned support for its argument from two sources: (1)
Missouri case law defining the admissibility of expert testimony; and (2)
appellate decisions from the other jurisdictions that have upheld the ex-
clusion of such testimony.
The court identified two competing standards which Missouri courts
have utilized in the admission of expert testimony-the capability test and
the helpfulness test.200 State v. Taylor stated, "The rule in Missouri is that
expert opinion testimony 'should never be admitted unless it is clear that
the jurors themselves are not capable, for want of experience or knowledge
195. Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d at 823 (citing State v. Kemp, 199 Conn. 473,
-, 507 A.2d 1387, 1389 (1986)).
196. State v. Brooks, 513 S.W..2d 168, 173 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973). The Missouri
Court of Appeals stated in Brooks, "[Flor a jury to assess the credibility of a
witness, it must be aware of facts which might cause a witness to be less than
fully truthful or untruthful. The determination of that credibility is solely within
the province of the jury and it is entitled to any information which might bear
on that credibility." See also R. HASL & J. O'BRmN, supra note 108, § 5-1, at
39.
197. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
198. State v. Russel, 625 S.W.2d 138, 141 (Mo. 1981); Brooks, 513 S.W.2d
at 173; R. HML & J. O'BFiEN, supra note 108, § 5-1, at 39. See also Woocher,
supra note 13, at 1001. Jeremy Bentham felt that exclusion of evidence was justifiable
only in very limited circumstances: "Evidence is the basis of justice; to exclude
evidence is to exclude justice." 7 J. BENTHAM, THE WoRKs oF JEREMY BENTHAM
338 (J. Bowring ed. 1962).
199. Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d at 823 (citing State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235,
239 (Mo. 1984)).
200. Id. at 822-23.
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of the subject, to draw correct conclusions from the facts proved."' 20'
Upon first consideration, this "capability" standard appears quite stringent.
Taylor tempered its statement, however, by further declaring that trial
courts should admit expert testimony if it will assist the jury.20 2 This is
the more lenient "helpfulness" test which many jurisdictions, including the
federal courts, have adopted. The "[e]ssential test of admissibility of expert
opinion evidence is whether it will be helpful to the jury. ' 203 One court
proposed a guideline for applying this helpfulness test: Expert testimony
is proper "if the subject is one with which lay jurors are not likely to be
conversant, and [is] one ... of value to the jury. ' 20 4
The supreme court did not indicate which of the two standards it
applied in Lawhorn. The standard used could very well have affected the
outcome of the appeal, as the two are very different. The court probably
201. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d at 239 (citations omitted); Cole v. Empire Dist.
Elec. Co., 331 Mo. 824, 833, 55 S.W.2d 434, 438 (1932). See also City of St.
Louis v. Kisling, 318 S.W.2d 221, 225 (Mo. 1959); R. HASL & J. O'BRImN, supra
note 108, § 9-3, at 120.
202. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d at 239. See also Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d at 822-23;
Garrett v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 631 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982);
Wood v. Ezell, 342 S.W.2d 503, 507 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961); R. HASL & J. O'BRIEN,
supra note 108, at 120; 19 WEsT's MIssouRI PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 171,
§ 457, at 472-73.
203. Parlow v. Dan Hamm Drayage Co., 391 S.W.2d 315, 326 (Mo. 1965);
State v. Marks, 721 S.W.2d 51, 55 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Randolph v. USF & G
Co., 626 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). This "helpfulness test" is similar
to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 which addresses the admission of expert testimony:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
FED. R. Evm. 702.
The Advisory Committee Notes indicate that the rule is purposefully phrased
broadly. Many state jurisdictions have adopted the equivalent of Rule 702. These
jurisdictions have both admitted and excluded expert psychological testimony when
applying this permissive standard. State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208
(1983) (admitting); People v. Beaver, 725 P.2d 96 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (excluding);
Commonwealth v. Francis, 390 Mass. 89, 453 N.E.2d 1204 (1983) (excluding); State
v. Helterbridle, 301 N.W.2d 545 (Minn. 1980) (excluding); State v. Buell, 22 Ohio
St. 3d 124, 489 N.E.2d 795 (1986) (admitting); Thomas v. State, 748 S.W.2d 539
(Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (excluding); State v. Moon, 45 Wash. App. 692, 726 P.2d
1263 (Wash. 1986) (admitting); State v. Guloy, 104 Wash. 2d 412, 705 P.2d 1182
(1985) (excluding); State v. Taylor, 50 Wash. App. 481, 749 P.2d 181 (1988)
(admitting).
One commentator states, "[A]s under the Missouri practice, the trial judge
[using Federal Rule of Evidence 702] has broad discretion in the admission or
exclusion of expert testimony, and ... should not be reversed unless it is found
to be manifestly erroneous." R. HAsL & J. O'BRmN, supra note 108, § 9-3A, at
121.
204. Wessar v. John Chezik Motors, Inc., 623 S.W.2d 599, 602 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1981) (citations omitted). See also Marks, 721 S.W.2d at 55.
[Vol. 54
30
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 3 [1989], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/9
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS
considered both tests and formulated a combined standard. It recognized
that expert psychological testimony could potentially aid the jury and might
make some contribution in particular cases. 20 5 The court insisted, however,
that the proffered expert testimony deal with basic principles of which the
jury had a general understanding and was capable of applying to the
facts. 2 6 Thus, the court apparently utilized both standards but seemingly
gave more weight to the stricter "capability" test, given the outcome of
the appeal.
Regardless of the standard actually employed, the "invasion of the
province of the jury" premise of the court's argument is questionable.
Missouri jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that invasion of ihe
jury's province is not a valid objection to expert testimony. 2°7 More sig-
nificantly, courts have held that witnesses "may testify to facts which if
believed by the jury would have the effect of discrediting another witness
before the jury without thereby invading the province of the jury. ' 2 8 This
view seems contradictory to Taylor. Lawhorn, however, cited Taylor out
of context. Examination of the decision reveals that Taylor also stated that
"opinion (evidence) cannot 'invade the province of a jury. ' '' 2°9 In addition,
State v. Paglino,210 cited in Taylor, posited: '[a]n objection that an expert
opinion invades the province of the jury is not a valid one."' 21' Taken in
the full context of Taylor, Lawhorn's assertion that comment on the
credibility of witnesses is an invasion of the jury's province is not convincing.
All expert opinion invades the jury's province to some extent, in the sense
that it represents a conclusion gathered from the facts of the case. 212
205. Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d at 823 (citing Commonwealth v. Francis, 390
Mass. 89, 98, 453 N.E.2d 1204, 1210 (1983)).
206. Id.
207. Wessar, 623 S.W.2d at 602. See also Barnes v. Omark Indus., 369 F.2d
4, 7 (8th Cir. 1966); Mann v. Grim-Smith Hosp. & Clinic, 347 Mo. 348, 353, 147
S.W.2d 606, 608 (1941); Cole v. Uhlmann Grain Co., 340 Mo. 277, -, 100
S.W.2d 311, 322 (1937); McKinley v. Vize, 563 S.W.2d 505, 511 (Mo. Ct. App.
1978); Fair Mercantile Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 237 Mo. App.
511, 520, 175 S.W.2d 930, 934 (1943).
Both McCormick and Wigmore expressed distaste for the "invasion of thejury's province" argument. McCoRaMcK, supra note 32, § 206, at 623; 3 J. WiGMoRE,
EVIDENCE § 673, at 936 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) ("The usurpation theory ...
has done much to befog bench and bar.").
208. Fries v. Berberich, 177 S.W.2d 640 (Mo. Ct. App. 1944). See also State
v. Willis, 706 S.W.2d 265, 267 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Shearin v. Fletcher/Mayo/
Assoc., 687 S.W.2d 198, 200 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (rejected the holding of Holliman
v. Cabanne, 43 Mo. 568, 570 (1869), that "[w]itnesses should not give their opinions
upon the truth of a statement by another witness.").
209. 663 S.W.2d at 239 (citing State v. Paglino, 319 S.W.2d 613, 623 (Mo.
1958)). See also Eickmann v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 363 Mo. 651, 663, 253
S.W.2d 122, 129 (1952).
210. 319 S.W.2d 613 (Mo. 1958).
211. Id. at 623 (citations omitted).
212. Id. (citations omitted). Paglino further stated:
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Moreover, expert psychological testimony does not expressly comment
on witness credibility because it is usually limited to general psychological
principles. Therefore, since the expert does not "particularize" his testimony
to the eyewitness, an invasion of the province of the jury cannot occur.
In addition, the trial court has broad discretion in placing limits on an
expert's testimony.213 Thus, the considerable precedent rejecting the "in-
vasion of the jury's province" argument casts doubt on the Taylor view-
point. Also, since the jury is completely free to either accept or reject the
expert's testimony, an expert psychologist cannot invade the jury's province;
his testimony is not binding on the trier of fact. 214
The court avoided several additional arguments typically used to reject
such expert testimony, probably deliberately because Missouri law disfavors
these arguments. Lawhorn did not attempt to exclude the expert psycho-
logical testimony because it involved an ultimate fact in issue-the credibility
of the eyewitness, which is to be determined by the jury. Missouri courts
have expressly rejected this common law doctrine.2 5 Nor did the supreme
court reject the expert testimony for failure to make a sufficient offer of
proof. Rather, Lawhorn announced that appellant's counsel had made a
'An expert witness, in a manner, discharges the functions of a juror'
because, in matters in which intelligent conclusions cannot be drawn from
the facts by inexperienced persons, experts, 'who by experience, observation,
or knowledge, are peculiarly qualified to draw conclusions from such facts,
are, for purposes of aiding the jury, permitted to give their opinion.'
Id. at 623-24 (citations omitted). See also McKinley v. Vize, 563 S.W.2d 505, 510
(Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
213. State v. Moon, 726 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986).
214. Sunset Acres Motel, Inc. v. Jacobs, 336 S.W.2d 473, 484 (Mo. 1967);
Baugh v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co. of Tenn., 307 S.W.2d 660, 665 (Mo. 1957);
J.L.P. v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865, 868 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Tennis v. General
Motors Corp., 625 S.W.2d 218, 222 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (jury in a strict or
products liability case, as in any other such case, has leave to believe or disbelieve
all, part or none of the testimony of any witness); Gibson v. Reliable Chevrolet,
Inc., 608 S.W.2d 471, 473 n.1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); R. HASL & J. O'BRIEN, supra
note 108, § 9-9, at 130; 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 673, at 936 (McNaughton
rev. ed. 1961).
215. Eickmann v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 363 Mo. 651, 663, 253 S.W.2d
122, 129-30 (1952); State v. Willis, 706 S.W.2d 265, 267 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986);
Wessar v. John Chezik Motors, Inc., 623 S.W.2d 599, 602 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981);
McKinley v. Vize, 563 S.W.2d 505, 510-11 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); State ex rel. State
Highway Comm'n v. Lindley, 232 Mo. App. 831, 113 S.W.2d 132 (1938). But see
Baptiste v. Boatmen's Nat'l Bank of St. Louis, 148 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Mo. 1941)
(a witness is not permitted to express an opinion on questions directly in issue and
thereby invade the province of the jury); Frangos v. Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co., 203 S.W.2d 894, 897 (Mo. Ct. App. 1947) (expert testimony is admissible
but should not invade the province of the jury upon the ultimate facts to be
decided). See also R. HASL & J. O'BRIEN, supra note 108, § 9-4, at 122; McContlscK,
supra note 32, § 12, at 30-31.
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full offer of proof.216 Furthermore, the supreme court lacked any legal
basis for upholding the exclusion because the testimony would have con-
cerned only general variables affecting reliability rather than any particular
witness's identification. Missouri practice allows an expert witness to simply
expound relevant principles in an area without drawing conclusions. 217 No
requirement exists that the expert take "the further step of stating an
opinion or inference.P 218
Finally, although the appellate court proclaimed a rule of modified
discretion, the supreme court quickly glossed over the discretion issue. The
court briefly mentioned discretion at the end of its opinion: "The trial
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit Dr. Goldstein's
testimony.' '219 From this meager statement, Missouri judges and attorneys
are to infer that expert psychological testimony is a matter subject to the
trial judge's sound discretion. This weak statement seems odd given that
Lawhorn was the first Missouri case to directly confront this complex issue,
as well as the first such case before the Missouri Supreme Court. The
appellate court articulated its approval of discretionary authority much
more clearly. Unfortunately, the appellate court opinion will remain un-
known to most trial judges and attorneys. 220 If the supreme court intended
to confer broad discretion on the trial court, perhaps it should have adopted
the appellate court's straightforward approach and stated its holding more
emphatically.
2. Procedural Safeguards
The supreme court focused on three procedural safeguards to justify
the exclusion of expert psychological testimony: (1) exclusion of unreliable
216. Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d at 822. Bullington presented the standard for an
adequate offer of proof:
The proper procedure for an offer of proof as to a witness who is ...
precluded from testifying is to present and preserve the offer by questions
to and answers by the witness from the stand. An offer of proof may,
however, be in narrative form through a summation by counsel, but if
so, the summation must be definite, specific and set out the content of
the testimony to demonstrate its admissibility. When a party fails to make
an offer of proof in question and answer form, the risk is present that
a reviewing court will find the offer insufficient.
Bullington, 680 S.W.2d at 243-44. In Lawhorn, the defense presented a full in
camera offer of proof in question and answer form.
217. State v. Saussele, 265 S.W.2d 290, 296-97 (Mo. 1954); R. HAsL & J.
O'BRIEN, supra note 108, § 9-3A, at 121.
218. Id.
219. Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d at 823. In reference to procedural safeguards, the
court mentioned that "if the trial court, in its discretion, denies admissibility,"
the defendant still has protection. Id.
220. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
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eyewitness testimony, (2) cross-examination of the eyewitness; and (3) closing
argument. According to the supreme court, the appellant's opportunity to
cross-examine the eyewitness and to challenge his reliability in final argument
compensated for the lack of expert testimony.221
Lawhorn implied that outright exclusion of eyewitness testimony sufficed
as a safeguard. It stated "[d]ue process requires that such identifications
be used only if they are reliable, and are not the product of unnecessarily
suggestive police procedures."m The United States Supreme Court adopted
five factors for determining whether eyewitness identification testimony is
admissible: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the
time of the crime; (2) the witness's degree of attention; (3) the accuracy
of his prior description of the criminal; (4) the level of certainty dem-
onstrated at the confrontation;m2 and (5) the time between the crime and
confrontation.22 The trial court obviously felt that the eyewitness testimony
sufficiently met these factors, for it allowed Jensen's testimony. 25 In ad-
dition, the Supreme Court has provided various constitutional protections
against suggestive police identification procedures.2 6
Lawhorn also indicated that expert psychological testimony is unnec-
essary because attorneys can thoroughly explore the weaknesses of iden-
tifications in cross-examination and closing argument.227 Bullington stated:
"probing cross-examination is an adequate tool for presenting to the jury
the facts necessary for the jury to evaluate the reliability of the identification
evidence." 228 Many other jurisdictions have also held that cross-examination
221. Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d at 823.
222. Id. See also Woocher, supra note 13, at 1000-02.
223. This factor has been subjected to much criticism from psychologists.
Many tend to agree that the eyewitness' certainty of his identification has no
correlation to actual accuracy. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text. This
was one of Dr. Goldstein's contentions. Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d at 822.
224. Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409
U.S. 188, 199 (1972). These were also adopted by Missouri in State v. Burns, 671
S.W.2d 306, 310 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). See also State v. Robinson, 641 S.W.2d
423, 427 (Mo. 1982); State v. Higgins, 592 S.W.2d 151, 160 (Mo. 1979); State v.
Craven, 657 S.W.2d 357, 361 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Hurst, 612 S.W.2d
846, 851 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); State v. Patterson, 598 S.W.2d 483, 488 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1980).
225. However, the significance of the admission of the eyewitness testimony
is diminished by the fact that courts rarely ever exclude it.
226. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
227. Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d at 823 (citing State v. Kemp, 199 Conn. 473,
475, 507 A.2d 1387, 1390 (1986) (citing State v. George, 194 Conn. 361, 369, 481
A.2d 1068, 1075 (1984))).
.228. State v. Bullington, 680 S.W.2d 238, 244 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). State
v. Whitmill, No. 30-472, slip op. at 3 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 3, 1989), indicated that
"where the weaknesses in identification may be explored on cross-examination and
in final argument," it is inappropriate to introduce expert psychological testimony.
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is an adequate safeguard against unreliable identification. 229 Some courts
have argued that expert psychological testimony can provide assistance to
the jury "beyond that obtained through cross-examination. ' 230
Unlike other courts,2' Lawhorn did not claim that a cautionary iden-
tification instruction would have served as a sufficient safeguard. This was
not an oversight, rather Missouri courts have held that such instructions
are unnecessary. State v. Quinn,232 the controlling decision, declared that
cautionary identification instructions are unnecessary in Missouri courts
because the subject is fully covered by pattern instructions contained in
the Missouri Approved Instructions-Criminal (MAI-CR3d). 33 The MAI-
CR3d does not include an instruction regarding misidentification. 2 4 Fur-
229. United State v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 458
U.S. 1109 (1982); United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1973);
People v. Plasencia, 168 Cal. App. 3d 546, 556, 214 Cal. Rptr. 316, 327 (1985);
State v. George, 194 Conn. 361, 481 A.2d 1068, 1075 (1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1191 (1985); Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827, 832 (D.C. Ct. App. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 973 (1985); Johnson v. State, 438 So. 2d 774, 777 (Fla.
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 (1984); Porter v. State, 188 Ga. App. 675,
-, 373 S.E.2d 805, 807 (1988); State v. Kay, 108 Idaho 661, 667, 701 P.2d
281, 287 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985); Bloodsworth v. State, 307 Md. 164, -, 512
A.2d 1056, 1063 (1986); Commonwealth v. Francis, 390 Mass. 89, -, 453 N.E.2d
1204, 1208 (1983); State v. Helterbridle, 301 N.W.2d 545, 546 (Minn. 1980); Porter
v. State, 94 Nev. 142, 146, 576 P.2d 275, 279 (1988); State v. Wooden, 658 S.W.2d
553, 557 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983); Thomas v. State, 748 S.W.2d 539, 540 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1988). See also Lane, supra note 3, at 1358.
230. State v. Taylor, 50 Wash. App. 481, 484, 749 P.2d 181, 184 (1988).
231. United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v.
Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973); People v. Lawson, 37 Colo. App. 442,
551 P.2d 206 (1976); State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 635 P.2d 1236 (1981).
The argument that cross-examination should serve as an adequate means of
drawing eyewitness identification into question is based more on tradition than
sound logic. This is demonstrated in Amaral by the Ninth Circuit's statement,
"Our legal system places primary reliance for the ascertainment of truth on the
'test of cross-examination."' 488 F.2d at 1153 (citation omitted).
232. State v. Quinn, 594 S.W.2d 599 (Mo. 1980).
233. Id. at 605. See also State v. Thomure, 706 S.W.2d 521, 523 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1986); State v. Carter, 691 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). See
generally Harris, Identification in Criminal Cases: Is Missouri a Decade Behind?,
43 J. Mo. BAR 93, 95-96 (1987).
234. Quinn, 594 S.W.2d at 604. Quinn postulated that Missouri Approved
Instruction-Criminal (Second) [hereinafter MAI-CR2d] 2.01, defining the duties of
the judge and jury, and MAI-CR2d 3.20, the alibi instruction, adequately present
the misidentification defense. Id.
The pertinent part of MAI-CR3D 302.01, the revised version of MAI-CR2D 2.01,
provides:
[Y]ou alone must decide upon the believability of the witnesses and the
weight and value of the evidence.
In determining the believability of a witness and the weight to be
given to testimony of the witness, you may take into consideration the
witnesses' manner while testifying; the ability and opportunity of the witness
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thermore, Note 2 of MAI-CR3d 302.01 states that "no other or additional
instruction may be given on the believability of witnesses, or the effect,
weight, or value of their testimony.'"'2 The Missouri Supreme Court gen-
erally disapproves of cautionary identification instructions because it believes
they constitute an impermissible judicial comment on the evidence. 2 6 In
light of prevailing Missouri law, the supreme court correctly chose not to
urge a cautionary identification instruction as a procedural protection against
mistaken identification in Lawhorn.
to observe and remember any matter about which testimony is given...
the reasonableness of the witness' testimony considered in the light of all
of the evidence in the case; and any other matter that has a tendency in
reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness of the testimony of the witness.
The pertinent part of MAI-CR3D 308.04, the revised version of MAI-CR2D
3.20, provides:
One of the issues ... (in this case) is whether the defendant was present
at [the time and place of the alleged offense]. On that issue, you are
instructed as follows:
1. The state has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant was present at the time and place the offense is alleged
to have been committed.
2. If the evidence in this case leaves in your mind a reasonable doubt
that the defendant was present at [the time and place of the alleged
offense], then you must find the defendant not guilty .
Justice Seiler, dissenting, stated:
I believe that eyewitness identification testimony presents grave hazards
due to the inherent unreliability of human perception and memory, and
in the susceptibility of eyewitnesses to suggestive influences ....
... Mistaken identification is a legitimate defense and this incom-
pleteness in our instruction repertoire should no longer be permitted to
exist. I believe that we should request our committee on pattern criminal
instructions to draft recommended instructions on the subject.
Quinn, 594 S.W.2d at 606 (Seiler, J., dissenting). Despite this request, the Missouri
Supreme Court Committee on Criminal Jury Instructions and Charges shows no
indication that it plans to recommend such an instruction.
235. MAI-CR3D 302.01, note 2. State v. Bullington, 680 S.W.2d 238, 245
(Mo. Ct. App. 1984), stated that the Notes on Use expressly forbid an identification
instruction. On motion for rehearing, the court stated that Note 2 was to be
"religiously observed" and that the proposed instruction merely repeated the content
of an existing pattern instruction. Id.; Quinn, 594 S.W.2d at 605; State v. Hutton,
645 S.W.2d 22, 24 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) ("In Missouri, it is unnecessary to give
an instruction on identification when other instructions given to the jury adequately
present the defendant's theory."); State v. Manning, 634 S.W.2d 504, 506 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1982); State v. Holmes, 622 S.W.2d 358, 362 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). In
addition, Missouri Supreme Court Rule 28.02(c) excludes the use of any other
instruction whenever there is an applicable MAI-CR3D instruction.
Although the supreme court has held that the refusal to give such cautionary
instructions constitutes reversible error, it has done so only in cases decided before
the adoption of the Missouri Approved Instructions. See State v. Murphy, 508
S.W.2d 269, 276 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974).
236. State v. Taylor, 472 S.W.2d 395, 401-02 (1971).
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VI. STATE v. WHITmIL: A DEFmnI-vE RuLiNG ON EXPERT
PSYCHOLOGIcAL TESTIMoNY iN THE WAKE OF LAWHORN
A. The Facts
Two brothers, Nivey and Theordis Mitchell, were walking home in
Kansas City, Missouri on a February evening in 1987.237 Prostitutes solicited
from passing cars in an area near their home, causing automobile traffic
and congestion. 238 The traffic had been a constant annoyance to the brothers2319
As usual, Nivey and Theordis observed several prostitutes soliciting passing
motorists and complained to the women regarding their close proximity to
the Mitchell home.3 The confrontation escalated until Theordis shoved
one of the women to the ground. 24t She left and soon returned with a
black man who continued the argument until he drew a gun and shot both
brothers. 242 Nivey later made an in-court identification of the appellant as
his assailant, however, Theordis was unable to positively identify him.23
The appellant presented an alibi defense. 244 In addition, Leon Cunn
testified that he, not appellant, had shot the men. 245 Cunn produced a gun
which a ballistics test proved was the gun used in the shooting. 246 Two
other witnesses testified that Cunn was responsible for the shootings. 247
Appellant also offered the expert psychological testimony of Dr. Alvin
Goldstein. 248 The trial court excluded the testimony and the jury convicted
Whitmill of two counts of first degree assault and two counts of armed
criminal action.249 He was sentenced to consecutive terms of life impris-
onment.












248. Id. The facts in Whitmill present a much more compelling case for the
admission of expert psychological testimony than the facts of Lawhorn. In Whitmill,
the state's case relied solely on eyewitness identification. Another party confessed
to the shootings and no corroborating evidence existed. In Lawhorn, substantial
corroborating evidence linked the defendant to the crime.
249. Id.
250. Id. Appellant also challenged as plain error his conviction of two counts
of armed criminal action as a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the United
States Constitution. Id. at 5. He contended that his convictions for the armed
criminal actions were "improperly cumulative" when "stacked" on the two counts
of first degree assault. Id. The appellate court upheld the conviction and sentencing.
Id. Analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this Note.
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B. The Holding
The Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, reviewed State v.
Whitmill and handed down its decision only three weeks after the Lawhorn
decision. The appellate court's opinion is significant in several respects.
First, it represents the first attempt by a Missouri court to expound a
definitive, per se rule on the admissibility of expert psychological testimony.
Second, the western district declared a per se rule without any clear precedent
supporting such a rule. Because no other jurisdiction has yet adopted an
absolute rule on admissibility, Whitmill presents an innovative approach.
The court expressed dissatisfaction with the approach taken in Chapple
and McDonald because their holdings present serious problems in deter-
mining which fact patterns qualify a case for the admission of expert
testimony.251 Although these prior decisions suggested that an appropriate
case for admission of expert psychological testimony would exist when the
facts cast doubt on the reliability of the eyewitness identification, they did
not:
[I]nform a trial judge with any degree of certainty when his discretionary
authority must be abandoned and when the composite of facts makes
admission of expert testimony mandatory, what remains is merely an ad
hoc determination, case by case ....2
Furthermore, the court was discontented with the status of admissibility
following Lawhorn. Although Lawhorn approved the use of discretion, it
left open the question of whether expert psychological testimony is ap-
propriate for admission in any case. 213 According to the western district,
since expert testimony impermissibly undercuts the credibility of an eye-
witness, a situation will never arise in Missouri where admission would be
acceptable.214 In the western district's paternalistic view, "the bench and
bar [is] be best served by a definitive statement of the issue of whether
[expert psychological testimony] is admissible at all ... "255
The appellate court held that expert psychological testimony is inad-
missible in every situation. For the benefit of trial courts wrestling with
the problem in the future, the appellate court emphatically held:
[S]uch evidence should be excluded, not as a discretionary decision by the
trial court from case to case, but because the subject is one upon which
jurors have already become informed by experience in every day life. That
common experience is not dependent on the facts of any particular case
and therefore no trial court discretion is implicated. Moreovei, such expert
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testimony treads upon the prohibition against one witness expressing an
opinion upon the credibility of another.26
No other Missouri court has previously adopted such a restrictive ap-
proach . 7 In fact, Whitmill is the only reported decision adopting a strict
per se rule of inadmissiblity of such expert testimony. The decision clearly
falls within category four.
The lack of supportive precedent makes the Whitmill rule somewhat
inexplicable. All previous Missouri decisions have indicated that the decision
to admit such expert testimony is subject to the sound discretion of the
trial judge and reviewable only for abuse of this discretion. Yet, the western
district believed its holding was within the supreme court's intent, as
expressed in Lawhorn. Whitmill emphasized the supreme court's statement
in Lawhorn that expert psychological testimony is a matter within the
common knowledge of the jury. The western district reasoned that "[i]f
the matter of reliability ... of observations by eyewitnesses is within the
common experience of jurors, then expert testimony on the subject is
inappropriate and a trial judge has no discretionary authority to admit the
evidence."28
This reasoning is illogical in several respects. The appellate court's
reasoning is premised on the assumption that all factors affecting identi-
fication reliability are always within the common knowledge of jurors.
Such a broad assertion inherently risks overinclusiveness. Moreover, the
grant of discretionary authority to the trial court by the majority of courts
would be meaningless if this assumption was valid. If all potential factors
affecting reliability are considered always known by jurors, the trial judge
would never have occasion to wield his discretionary power; it would be
a useless authority. Surely, this result is not what the majority of courts
intended by granting discretionary power. Furthermore, even if the as-
sumption is accurate, future psychological research could reveal additional
factors affecting the reliability of identifications which the judiciary might
conclude are outside the realm of jurors' knowledge and, therefore, ad-
missible. Under the Whitmill rule, the expert testimony would be absolutely
prohibited no matter how helpful any future research might be to the jury.
The only recourse would be an appeal seeking reversal of Whitmill, an
expensive and time-consuming process.
While the majority of courts have rejected such expert testimony based
on a "common knowledge of jurors" argument, none have followed Whit-
256. Id.
257. Interestingly, Judge Clark supported the majority opinion in the western
district's decision of both Lawhorn and Whitmill. In the interim, he seems to have
varied his opinion on the issue somewhat. He has moved from the more permissive
Lawhorn holding that expert psychological testimony may be admissible in some
cases to the Whitmill absolute preclusion of such testimony. This sudden turnabout
adds to the confusion stirred by the Whitmill decision.
258. Id. (emphasis added).
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mill's reasoning and adopted a per se rule of inadmissibility. 59 The logic
of Whitmill pales when viewed in this context. State v. Whitmill disregards
the prevailing Missouri law on the admissibility of expert psychological
testimony and lacks alignment with the overwhelming majority of other
jurisdictions. The court's application of faulty logic in establishing a per
se rule of inadmissibility renders Whitmill an appropriate case for reversal
in favor of a more permissive rule of admissibility.
VIl. A SUGGESTED APPROACH TO ADISSIBILITY OF EXPERT
PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY
Lawhorn and Whitmill left uncertain the status of admissibility of
expert psychological testimony in Missouri. Neither case offered a satis-
factory ruling which would assist in combatting the difficulties surrounding
eyewitness identification. When the issue again confronts Missouri judges,
as it undoubtedly will, perhaps the bench will be receptive to arguments
favoring a more permissive rule. If so, what rule should the courts adopt?
Clearly, a per se rule of admissibility (category one) is an inappropriate
approach in Missouri for many of the reasons detailed in Section II. No
other jurisdiction has succeeded in justifying such a rule and Missouri
courts are just as unlikely to do so. Discretionary admissibility (category
2) is also an inadequate approach since, as Whitmill indicated, Missouri
case law does not provide any guidelines for the trial judge's use in exercising
his discretionary authority nor does it indicate whether any factual situation
mandates admission. 260 Whitmill wisely advocated a definitive statement or
guideline regarding the admissibility of such expert testimony. A properly
formulated guideline would alleviate the possibility of arbitrary exercises
of trial court discretion. In addition, a guideline would provide uniformity.
Therefore, a rule of modified discretionary authority (category three) best
accommodates the interests involved in the admission of expert psychological
testimony. Such a rule would provide criteria to assist the trial judge in
determining which factual situations would mandate admission of such
259. State v. Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Mo. 1988) (en banc). State v.
Hamm, 146 Wis. 2d 130, 430 N.W.2d 584 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988), appeal denied,
436 N.W.2d 30 (1988), involved a situation analogous to the Lawhorn-Whitmill
duo. The Wisconsin Supreme Court had previously ruled in Hampton v. State, 92
Wis. 2d 450, 457-58, 285 N.W.2d 868, 872 (1979), that admission of expert
psychological testimony rested within the trial court's discretion, just as the Missouri
Supreme Court did in Lawhorn. Subsequently in Hamm, an appellate court rejected
the adoption of a per se rule of inadmissibility of such expert testimony, just as
the western district should have done in Whitmill. Hamm, 430 N.W.2d at 591
(held that trial court erred in excluding expert psychological testimony because it
lacked factual basis for its ruling-the trial court had heard no testimony from
the expert).
260. Whitmill, No. 30-472, slip op. at 5.
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expert testimony. If the defendant could not meet the established criteria,
the trial judge would then have complete discretionary authority to either
admit or exclude the expert testimony. This rule would preserve the tra-
ditional discretionary authority of the trial judge while protecting against
potentially erroneous identifications, but only in those instances where the
identification is most likely to be unreliable.
Proposed criteria for guiding the trial court in the mandatory admission
of expert psychological testimony should include the following: (1) the
eyewitness identification of the defendant is the principal element in the
prosecution's case; (2) the identification is not substantially corroborated
by other evidence which would grant it independent reliability; (3) the
proffered expert witness is properly qualified as an expert within the field;
(4) there is a proper "fit" between the specific psychological factors en-
compassed within the proffered expert testimony and the specific facts of
the case; (5) the expert psychologist is limited to presenting only general
psychological principles or research and is not allowed to tailor his opinion
to the reliability of any particular eyewitness; and (6) the expert psychologist
is allowed to expound only psychological principles which are both (a)
strongly supported by scientific research and (b) scientifically demonstrated
to be either partially unknown or misunderstood by the average juror. If
these six criteria are met, a trial judge must admit the expert psychological
testimony; he makes no discretionary call.
The requirement of a proper "fit" would ensure the exclusion of
irrelevant evidence, thus, guarding against undue consumption of time. In
addition, the "fit" requirement would reduce confusion as jurors attempt
to comprehend the link between the expert testimony and identification
reliability. To demonstrate the concept, assume a white eyewitness identifies
another white as his assailant; expert testimony concerning the "own race"
effect would lack a proper "fit". The same would be true for testimony
regarding the "weapons effect" if the evidence indicates that no weapon
was involved.
By refusing to allow the expert witness to particularize his testimony
to a specific witness, the court would avoid any argument that the expert
had improperly commented on the credibility of another witness. Once
presented with the general psychological principles, the jury would apply
them to the particular facts of the case and determine for itself whether
it believes the eyewitness testimony is reliable. The jury would remain free
to either accept or reject the expert testimony.
Finally, strong empirical evidence that supports the existence of the
factors affecting reliability would add validity to the testimony. In addition,
it would refute the argument that trial courts should wholly exclude expert
psychological testimony because some research results are weak. The trial
court should exclude only those factors affecting eyewitness testimony when
1989]
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research results are inconclusive or negative. 6' In addition, the trial court
should verify from the offer of proof that scientific research has dem-
onstrated that the proffered reliability factors are not likely to be understood
or known by the juror.26 This criterion counters the primary argument
against the admission of such expert testimony-that such psychological
factors are within the common knowledge of jurors.
Submission of a cautionary identification instruction to the jury in
addition to the admission of expert psychological testimony would provide
the best protection against erroneous identifications. Since the MAI-CR3d
does not include such an instruction, the Missouri Supreme Court would
first have to adopt a new pattern instruction.23
An identification instruction should satisfy two criteria: (1) it should
articulate the legal standards that jurors must use to decide the case; and
(2) it should describe the factors affecting the reliability of identifications.34
The instruction should address at least five indicia of reliability: (1) the
capacity and opportunity of the eyewitness to observe the offender; (2)
the circumstances under which the eyewitness made the observation; (3)
whether the eyewitness actually made the observation; (4) whether the
eyewitness has made an inconsistent identification of the offender; and (5)
the credibility of the witness. 25
The model instruction adopted in United States v. Telfaire266 would
provide a basis from which the Committee on Pattern Criminal Instructions
could begin drafting an appropriate instruction.267
261. Dr. Alvin Goldstein believes that the existence of the confidence-accuracy
relationship, the "own-race effect" and time estimation effect (eyewitnesses tend
to overestimate the time spent observing the perpetrator) are most strongly supported
by empirical evidence. Telephone interview with Dr. Alvin Goldstein, Professor of
Psychology, University of Missouri-Columbia (March 24, 1989).
262. Psychologists have suggested that a variable used in expert psychological
testimony should meet three qualifications: (1) it is known to affect eyewitness
testimony; (2) it is involved to some extent in the given case; and (3) the influence
of the variable is not adequately appreciated by the jury or judge. Wells, Lindsay
& Tousignant, supra note 13, at 284.
263. Missouri appellate courts have consistently affirmed refusals to give
cautionary identification instructions. State v. Quinn, 594 S.W.2d 599 (Mo. 1980);
State v. Thomure, 706 S.W.2d 521 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Carter, 691
S.W.2d 417 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Hurst, 612 S.W.2d 846 (Mo. Ct. App.
1981). Therefore, support of such an instruction will have to come from the
committee on pattern instructions. See supra notes 233-38 and accompanying text.
264. Green, Eyewitness Testimony and The Use of Cautionary Instructions,
8 U. BRmGEPORT L. REv. 15, 17 (1987).
265. Note, Eyewitness Identification Testimony and the Need for Cautionary
Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 60 WAsH. U.L.Q. 1387, 1407 (1983).
266. 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
267. The Telfaire court formulated a "Model Special Instruction on Identi-
fication," which reads:
One of the most important issues in this case is the identification of the
774 [Vol. 54
42
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 3 [1989], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/9
1989] EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS 775
Research has shown, however, that the Telfaire instruction may not
be entirely effective in alerting jurors of misidentification problems. 68 Thus,
defendant as the perpetrator of the crime. The Government has the burden
of providing identity, beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not essential that
the witness himself be free from doubt as to the correctness of his statement.
However, you, the jury, must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of
the accuracy of the identification of the defendant before you may convict
him. If you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was the person who committed the crime, you must find the defendant
not guilty.
Identification testimony is an expression of belief or impression by
the witness. Its value depends on the opportunity the witness had to
observe the offender at the time of the offense and to make a reliable
identification later.
In appraising the identification testimony of a witness, you should
consider the following:
(1) Are you convinced that the witness had the capacity and an adequate
opportunity to observe the offender?
Whether the witness had an adequate opportunity to observe the
offender at the time of the offense will be affected by such matters as
how long or short a time was available, how far or close the witness was,
how good were lighting conditions, whether the witness had had occasion
to see or know the person in the past.
[In general, a witness bases any identification he makes on his per-
ception through the use of his senses. Usually the witness identifies an
offender by the sense of sight-but this is not necessarily so, and he may
use other senses.]
(2) Are you satisfied that the identification made by the witness
subsequent to the offense was the product of his own recollection? You
may take into acount both the strength of the identification, and the
circumstances under which the identification was made.
If the identification by the witness may have been influenced by the
circumstances under which the defendant was presented to him for iden-
tification, you should scrutinize the identification with great care. You
may also consider the length of time that lapsed between the occurrence
of the crime and the next opportunity of the witness to see defendant,
as a factor bearing on the reliability of the identification.
[You may also take into account that an identification made by picking
the defendant out of a group of similar individuals is generally more
reliable than one which results from the presentation of the defendant
alone to the witness.]
[(3) You may take into account any occasions in which the witness
failed to make an identification of defendant, or made an identification
that was inconsistent with his identification at trial.]
(4) Finally, you must consider the credibility of each identification
witness in the same way as any other witness, consider whether he is
truthful, and consider whether he had the capacity and opportunity to
make a reliable observation on the matter covered by his testimony.
I again emphasize that the burden of proof on the prosecutor extends
to every element of the crime charged, and this specifically includes the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of the defendant
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the committee should propose a modified instruction which more adequately
communicates information regarding the reliability of identifications.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Missouri courts must take a more lenient stance on the admissibility
of expert psychological testimony to adequately combat the vagaries of
mistaken identification. A rule of modified discretion would best suit all
the interests at stake. Courts will need to overcome the precedent set by
Lawhorn and Whitmill. While Whitmill should not be difficult to overrule,
obtaining the reversal of Lawhorn will provide a greater challenge. In
addition, Missouri courts should combine the admission of expert psycho-
logical testimony with the adoption of an MAI-CR3d cautionary identi-
fication instruction. At least one supreme court judge has recognized that
"this incompleteness in [Missouri] instruction repertoire should no longer
be permitted to exist." 269 Although both of these devices would be somewhat
novel to Missouri practice, other jurisdictions have heartily supported them.
Moreover, jurisprudence is not static; it is adaptable to meet the needs of
justice. Regarding the admission of expert psychological testimony, justice
requires a more flexible approach than Missouri courts have been willing
to allow. It is time for a change.
BRENDA G. HAMILTON
as the perpetrator of the crime with which he stands charged. If after
examining the testimony, you have a reasonable doubt as to the accuracy
of the identification, you must find the defendant not. guilty.
Id. at 558-59 (brackets indicate what the court felt were optional portions).
268. Green, supra note 264, at 19-20.
269. Quinn, 594 S.W.2d at 606 (Seiler, J., dissenting).
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